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SHOOTING DOWN THE PHOENIX: SHAW v.
RENO AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER
RACE-CONSCIOUS DISTRICTING
This... is perhaps the Negro's temporary farewell to the Ameri-
can Congress. But let me say, Phoenix-like, he will rise up
someday and come again.
George White, Representative
from North Carolina, 19011
I. Introduction
It took ninety-one years, but the phoenix did rise again in North
Carolina, taking the form of Representative Eva Clayton and Rep-
resentative Melvin Watt, both elected to Congress in 1992. Their
futures are uncertain, however, as are those of many representa-
tives newly elected in 1992. Representatives Clayton and Watt are
members of a class of new black representatives that nearly
doubled the size of the Congressional Black Caucus.2 In addition
to North Carolina, the phoenix rose in Alabama, South Carolina,
Florida and Virginia, all of which sent their first black representa-
tives to Washington since Reconstruction.3 Many of these new rep-
resentatives attributed their victories in the 1992 elections to the
redistricting that followed the 1990 census pursuant to the
amended Voting Rights Act.
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno4 threatens this
progress. In Shaw, the Court held that majority-minority districts,
like the ones from which the above-mentioned representatives
were elected, could be struck down as unconstitutional if their
shapes could not be explained on any ground other than race and if
they were not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state inter-
1. Delia M. Rios, Blacks Expecting Big Gains in South; 39 Nationwide are Ex-
pected to Take House Seats on Tuesday, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 30, 1992,
at IA.
2. Sam Fulwood III, New Black Lawmakers Bring More Skills and Less Rhetoric
to Congress, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1993, at A4. Seventeen new black representatives
joined the House following the November, 1992 elections. They joined twenty-two
incumbents and newly elected Senator Carol Mosley-Braun, to give the Congressional
Black Caucus forty members. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A
Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1593, 1649 (1994).
3. William J. Eaton, New Blacks in Congress Vow to Aid Clinton, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1992, at A16.
4. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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est.5 The impact of Shaw has been significant; in fifteen months it
has already led to the invalidation of three district plans created by
the Act.6 Yet its future impact is not certain. The Shaw decision
has confused the four district courts that have interpreted it, and
has led each court to approach Shaw claims differently. Conse-
quently, the results of these cases have been puzzling and have pro-
duced no manageable standard for analysis. For example, while
the Southern District of Georgia invalidated a district of generally
average appearance, 7 the Eastern District of North Carolina up-
held the infamous "serpentine" District 12, which was the subject
of the original Shaw decision.8
Shaw will impact much more than the political life span of the
representatives serving in the threatened districts;9 it will also rede-
fine the manner in which voting rights advocates approach minor-
ity empowerment. Since the mid-1980s, enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act has focused on the creation of single-member majority-
minority districts in order to increase the ability of minority group
5. Id.
6. See Johnson v. Miller, No. CIV.A.194-008, 1994 WL 506780 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 12,
1994)(striking down Georgia Congressional districting plan as violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment), stay granted, 115 S. Ct. 36 (1994); Vera v. Richards, No.
CIV.A.H-94-0277, 1994 WL 484492 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1994)(declaring three Texas
majority-minority districts unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Hays
v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993)(3-judge panel), vacated, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (June 27, 1994)(remanded for reconsideration in light of new legislation), on
remand, No. 92-1522, 1994 WL 477159 (W.D. La. July 29, 1994)(holding new district-
ing plan unconstitutional), cert. granted, United States v. Hays, 63 U.S.L.W. 3295
(U.S. Dec. 12, 1994).
7. Johnson v. Miller, No. CIV.A.194-008, 1994 WL 506780 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 12,
1994), stay granted, 115 S. Ct. 36 (1994).
8. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994). See infra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text (describing the districts at issue in Shaw). See also infra part IV.B
(analyzing the district court decisions that have resolved Shaw claims).
9. Most of the incumbent members of the Congressional Black Caucus were eas-
ily reelected in November, 1994, and the Caucus actually increased its numerical
strength, although not because of Voting Rights Act redistricting. Adonis E. Hoff-
man, Perspectives on Election Fallout, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at B7. J.C. Watts, an
African-American Republican running in a 90% white, predominantly Democratic
district in Oklahoma, was elected to a seat in the United States House of Representa-
tives. On its face, the election of Representative Watts contradicts many of the argu-
ments that are presented within this Note; Representative Watts enjoyed a broad-
based appeal, however, that is extremely rare among first-time candidates, and that
may be explained by his status as a former quarterback for the University of
Oklahoma football team. See Tim Kurkijian, Sports People: JC. Watts, SPORTS ILLUs-
TRATED, Nov. 21, 1994, at 55 (analogizing the probability of success of an African-
American, Republican candidate running for Congress in a predominantly white and
Democratic district, with that of "a quarterback running the wishbone offense with a
weak line, a fullback who fumbles and halfbacks with no speed").
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members to elect representatives of their choice. In a single-mem-
ber district, voters who live within the district's boundaries elect
one representative to serve that district on the particular legislative
body. If the majority of the voters within a single-member district
are members of the minority within the general population of the
state, the district is termed a majority-minority district. This race-
conscious'0 method of districting is much more effective at increas-
ing minority representation than creating multi-member districts,
in which the entire electorate selects all members of a representa-
tive body. Multi-member districts submerge the minority group
within a general population in which it will always be outnum-
bered.1" The race-conscious method also encourages gerrymander-
ing, however. 12 Although supporters stress that gerrymandered
majority-minority districts are remedial in nature, critics still ques-
tion the legitimacy of a district that has been created by means of
deliberate manipulation. These critics fear that voting rights advo-
cates are attempting to secure proportional representation for mi-
norities, a right not granted by the Constitution or the Voting
Rights Act, while advocates reply that they are applying the only
viable means of minority empowerment in this political system.
10. Professor Lani Guinier adopted the term "race-conscious districting" to de-
scribe:the practice of consolidating minority group members in a single or limited
number of districts, thus -guaranteeing that group a representative of its choice in
those districts. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation and Race-Conscious Districting:
A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1589 n.2 (1993) [hereinafter
Guinier, Groups, Representation and Race-Conscious Districting].
11. The following hypothetical electoral system will clarify the distinction between
single-member and multi-member districts. Imagine that a municipality must elect a
ten-member school board. Under a multi-member system, the entire municipality will
constitute the relevant district. Each voter within that district will cast ten votes and
the candidates with the ten highest vote totals will be elected, Because all ten mem-
bers are selected out of one pool of voters, the majority within that pool will select
every member and the minority will be completely shut out. In contrast, a single-
member plan would divide the municipality into ten separate districts. Voters within
each district would vote for one candidate to represent them on the Board. There-
fore, the majority within each individual district selects one representative. Where
the relevant minority group forms a majority in one of the districts, it will have a
strong opportunity to elect a representative of its choice.
12. At its most basic level, a gerrymander is a district whose lines have been
manipulated for partisan purposes. It has also been defined as "such a thoughtful
construction of districts as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it
small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the opposing party with
overwhelming majorities in a small number of districts." Edward Still, Alternatives to
Single Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 248, 251 (Chandler Davidson
ed. 1984)(quoting JOHN R. COMMONS, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 49-51
(1896)).
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A minority group becomes empowered only when its votes are
as meaningful as the votes of members of other groups. Votes are
only meaningful when the group is able to elect the candidate of its
choice. Yet, "candidate of its choice" has come to mean a candi-
date of its race. Theoretically, if all members of a group were able
to elect candidates of their own race, they would achieve nearly
proportional representation. Although Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act prohibits states from interfering with a group's ability
to elect representatives of its choice, the Act explicitly does not
guarantee proportional representation. 13 Herein lies the conflict
between empowerment and proportional representation.
14
This Note analyzes the viability of race-conscious districting on
two separate levels: first in terms of its efficacy as a means of em-
powering minority voters, and second, in light of Shaw, which has
restricted the ability of states and localities to create majority-mi-
nority districts. Part II critiques the assumptions underlying race-
conscious districting and realistically evaluates the effects of such
districting, concluding that despite its shortcomings, race-conscious
districting has been very effective at empowering minority voters
and furthering their political interests. Part III traces the history of
the Voting Rights Act and how it influenced the Supreme Court's
treatment of vote dilution. Part IV predicts the future of race-con-
scious districting in light of Shaw v. Reno. Part IV also explores
the conflict between the race-conscious districting mandated by
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the prohibition against un-
constitutional gerrymanders under the Equal Protection Clause.
Part V argues that the Supreme Court, when it revisits this issue,
should treat majority-minority districts as a form of political, rather
than racial gerrymandering and therefore scrutinize them under
the standard set forth in Davis v. Bandemer.1
5
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)("Provided, That nothing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population.").
14. For more information on what Professor Lani Guinier has called the "political
empowerment norm," see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1424 (1991). For arguments in support of and against
proportional representation, see Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Inter-
ests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993)
[hereinafter, Guinier, Representation of Minority Interests]; Bruce Cain, Voting Rights
and Democratic Theory: Towards a Color Blind Society?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MI-
NORrrY VOING: THE VOTING RIGrrs ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 262 (Bernard Grofman
& Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
15. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
156
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U. The Emergence of Race-Conscious Districting
Traditionally, courts have supported race-conscious districting as
a simple, facially legitimate method of increasing minority repre-
sentation that does not seriously offend the majoritarian system. 16
The racial majority maintains political control within a single-mem-
ber district, yet district designers redefine the concept of major-
ity.17 Race-conscious districting has dramatically increased the
number of minority representatives sitting in Congress, state legis-
latures and local governing bodies.' 8 In addition to increasing rep-
resentation, these districts empower minority voters because they
promote the election of authentic representatives 9 of the minority
group.20 Authentic representatives are theoretically more respon-
sive to minority group needs than representatives elected by the
white majority, and therefore their presence inspires minorities to
participate in the political system.2' Majority-minority districts
thus have two interrelated salutary effects: increased representa-
tion and increased participation.
Critics, however, challenge race-conscious districting by alleging
that it increases factionalism. Such districting, critics argue, grants
16. Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests, supra note 14, at 1151.
17. Id.
18. Both Blacks and Hispanics are more successful in districted cities than in
multi-member, or at-large, cities. Furthermore, the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts has contributed invaluably to this success. One study found that in Southern
legislatures in 1989, only 2% of the 1,534 state legislators elected from majority-white
districts were black. In contrast, 60% of the legislators elected from majority-black
districts were black. Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, Postscript: What is
the Best Route to a Color-Blind Society?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING,
supra note 14, at 300, 309. Another study found that neither of the two Southern
black members of Congress sitting in 1985 were elected from majority-white districts.
Id. at 309-10.
19. Professor Lani Guinier refers to African-American elected officials as the
most authentic representatives for the African-American community. Such repre-
sentatives are community-based and culturally rooted to their constituents. Further-
more, minority-sponsored African-American candidates are more authentic than
white sponsored African-American candidates. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Token-
ism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH L.
REV. 1077, 1103-04 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism]. A widely
cited book by Hannah Pitkin labeled such representation as "descriptive representa-
tion." HANNAH PrrKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967). This Note
will refer to African-American representatives elected to serve African-American sin-
gle-member districts as authentic representatives.
20. Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests, supra note 14, at 1151-52.
Professor Guinier has labeled these rationalizations for single-member majority black
districts the Black Electoral Success Theory (BEST). For a comprehensive criticism
of BEST and its underlying assumptions, see Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism,
supra note 19 and Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests, supra note 14.
21. See Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests, supra note 14, at 1152.
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the right to a "safe" seat to some ethnic and racial groups but not
to others, thereby inhibiting the movement toward a "color-blind"
society.22 This criticism relies excessively on inaccurate assump-
tions and ignores fundamental flaws in the current districting sys-
tem that, left unchecked, would disproportionately harm racial
minorities. Furthermore, it overstates possible negative effects
while ignoring the actual benefits that accrue from this districting.
A. Districting Assumptions
Districting is premised on two assumptions, which, although ra-
cially neutral, have a strong impact on the perceptions and effects
of race-conscious districting. These assumptions, concerning geog-
raphy and fairness, have not only influenced the drawing of district
lines, but have also influenced judicial attitudes toward evaluating
challenged districts. Yet because these assumptions ignore the re-
alities of forced residential patterns and the political aspects of dis-
trict design, continued reliance upon them and their accuracy limits
the effectiveness of districting as a method of increasing
representation.
1. The Geography Assumption
The primary assumption behind districting is that geography is a
valid basis for defining a community of interests. Courts rely heav-
ily on geographic considerations in evaluating districts and are in-
stantly suspicious of any district that does not abide by traditional
districting principles. 23 This reliance reflects a traditional depen-
dence upon geographic boundaries as a measure of representation
within our system.24 Geographic proximity, however, is not the
only means of defining a shared community of interests. There-
fore, if a goal of districting is to empower minority voters who
share common interests regardless of their proximity to one an-
other, reliance upon geography may not be fair.
22. Cain, supra note 14, at 261; see also ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND STUDY, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE AcrION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS 237-38 (1987).
23. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp 1188 (W.D. La. 1993)(3-judge panel), va-
cated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (June 27, 1994)(remanded for reconsideration in light of new
legislation), on remand, No. 92-1522, 1994 WL 477159 (W.D. a. July 29, 1994)(hold-
ing new districting plan unconstitutional), cert. granted, United States v. Hays, 63
U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1994).
24. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Com-
pactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 178
(1989)(noting that states were given a role in the federal system because they were
distinct geographic entities).
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Grouping interests according to geography only is effective at
insuring increased minority representation, when an area includes
racially segregated residential patterns. Even in some generally
segregated communities, the population may be dispersed just
enough to prevent the creation of a single-member district domi-
nated by the minority group.2 Therefore, an emphasis on geogra-
phy only empowers voters if they happen to live very near one
another. This emphasis on defining commonality of interests as re-
quiring geographic proximity worsens the inequality for some mi-
norities because under such a system, their votes are less
meaningful not only when compared with white voters, but also
when compared with other minority voters who are geographically
packed. Moreover, the emphasis actively discriminates against
non-packed minority groups because it bases voter choices on ge-
ography although their interests have nothing to do with
geography.26
African-American voters share a strong commonality of interests
that influences their residential patterns. Judge A. Leon Higgin-
botham has noted that even where the African-American commu-
nity is dispersed throughout a state, that dispersion can be
explained by that state's history. of racism.27 Segregation and racial
hostility forced African-Americans to settle in areas where they
could "minimize physical hostility by whites and maximize the few
economic options permitted by racially discriminatory hiring prac-
tices. Accordingly, even where African-Americans live in small
communities dispersed throughout a state, the motivation behind
the location and structure of each of those communities is identical,
therefore linking them regardless of their proximity.
Judge Higginbotham has also explained that race and past racism
not only influence current housing patterns of African-Americans,
but also have effects beyond these patterns as well. Throughout
American history, most aspects of the African-American experi-
25. See, e.g., Hays, 839 F. Supp..at 1209 n.67 ("[W]hen the minority population is
spread so evenly throughout a state that a majority-minority district cannot be drawn
without dramatically impairing the constitutional rights of the citizens of that state,
there may simply be no constitutionally permissible way to draw such a district .... ").
26. See Karlan, supra note 24, at 181 (comparing policy decisions relevant to geog-
raphy (e.g., street paving, police services within one neighborhood) with those which
impact minorities regardless of their residential patterns (e.g., municipal hiring poli-
cies or proposed city-wide objectives)).
27. Higginbotham et al., supra note 2, at 1606.
28. Id.
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ence have been defined by skin color.29 To, disregard the common-
ality of interests of persons of the same skin color when districting,
simply because the African-American community is not completely
residentially segregated, "is not only naive, but demeaning. '30 It
ignores the lasting effect that decades of de jure segregation31 have
had on all African-Americans, not just those who live in compact
geographic areas.32 History has linked African-Americans cultur-
ally and politically to the extent that "it is likely that two African-
Americans will have more in common simply because of the color
of their skin than will random persons who happen to live within
the same compact district. '33 This strong, historically-based, com-
monality of interests defines African-American voters not only as a
racial group, but as a political group as well.
The requirement that districts be compact adds controversy to
the emphasis on geography. The Voting Rights Act, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,34 requires proof
that it is possible to design a compact district in which members of
the relevant minority group would form the majority in order to
sustain a claim of vote dilution.35 Additionally, twenty-five states
require by constitution or statute that legislative districts be com-
pact.36 Compactness has been an unmanageable requirement in
both of these contexts, however. In order to avoid Voting Rights
Act litigation, and on account of the Supreme Court's failure to
offer a compactness test, states have designed many minority dis-
tricts without adhering to the requirement of compactness. In state
litigation, courts have been generally unwilling to invalidate dis-
29. Id. at 1625. ("[Slince emancipation, race has remained more significant an
identifying factor than religion, region, age, class, or status. The history of race has
been more important to African-Americans than to any other component in this
society.").
30. Id.
31. De jure segregation "refers to segregation directly intended or mandated by
law or otherwise issuing from an official racial classification .... " BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 425 (6th ed. 1990).
32. Higginbotham et al., supra note 2, at 1627. Focusing on North Carolina, Judge
Higginbotham points out that, "[a]s a direct result of hundreds of years of oppres-
sion" in that state, African-Americans languish near the bottom of the socio-eco-
nomic scale. He supports that assertion with statistics regarding income, health,
public assistance, unemployment and educational achievement. Id.
33. Id. at 1628.
34. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
35. Id. at 50. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing the Gin-
gles standard for establishing vote dilution).
36. Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Dis-
tricts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MicH. L. REV. 483, 528 (1993).
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tricts on compactness grounds, out of deference towards legislative
decisions. 7 In the rare cases in which courts have entertained dis-
trict challenges on compactness grounds, they have relied on sub-
jective visual analyses rather than on any well-defined measure.38
Yet, compactness remains a requirement, even if one weighted dif-
ferently by various courts.3 9
Advocates of the compactness requirement stress that there will
be greater internal cohesion and common identity within compact
districts.4° Inherent in that argument, however, are two flawed
premises. The first is that persons can choose where they live,
which on account of economic and social constraints is not neces-
sarily true, especially for minorities. Further, as discussed above,
where persons live may have little or nothing to do with the degree
of commonality they share.41 The second flawed premise is that an
irregularly shaped district must have been designed for an illegiti-
mate purpose. Although some irregular districts are illegitimate,
so are many well-designed compact districts.42 Consequently, lack
of geographical compactness may serve as evidence of some dis-
criminatory intent behind the drawing of district lines, but should
not alone be grounds for striking down such districts entirely.
2. The Fairness Assumption
The second assumption underlying judicial support of race-con-
scious districting is that the persons responsible for drawing district
37. Id.
38. Id. at 530.
39. Compare Potter v. Washington County, 653 F. Supp. 121, 130 (N.D. Fla.
1986)(holding that plaintiffs had not met first prong of Gingles because proposed mi-
nority district "arbitrarily cuts diagonally through the center of the county") with Dil-
lard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (M.D. Ala.
1988)(holding that the relevant question is whether there will be a "strong sense of
community within the proposed.., district," not whether the district has four regular
or twenty-eight uncouth sides).
40. Richard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspective, in POLmICAL GERRYMANDER-
ING AND THE COURTS 212, 214 (Bernard Grofman, ed. 1990).
41. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
42. As one frequently quoted commentator has remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon
strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan
(or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly
drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid
one party." Robert J. Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips and Dumbbells - Who's Afraid
of Reapportionment, 75 YALE L.J. 1300, 1300 (1966).
For an example of the influence partisan politics plays on district design, see infra
note 44 and accompanying text; see also David D. Polsby and Robert D. Popper, The
Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerryman-
dering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301,309-13 (1991).
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lines will do so fairly without favoring a particular group. The curi-
ous paradox is that although race-conscious districting advocates
rely on this assumption regularly, no one actually believes that it is
true.43 In a classic illustration of the victor claiming the spoils, the
political party currently in power controls the redistricting process.
That allocation grants power to elected officials who may reflect
the interests of only a bare majority, to affect the representation of
all voters. More damaging in an empowerment context, however,
is that this allocation of power to the majority forces minority vot-
ers to depend upon district designers to increase minority represen-
tation, even though those designers may be driven by other
motives. Those in power are therefore likely to shape districts that
will ensure their own re-election, instead of creating districts that
will empower minority voters.44 Those who profess to believe this
assumption would also profess that if district designers were to
abuse their power, this abuse would appear blatantly in the shape
of the district. A compactly designed district, however, can be
every bit as discriminatory as a "bizarre" looking one.45 For this
reason, the assumption that district lines will be drawn fairly is not
only inaccurate, it is unmanageable.
When a race-conscious society adopts a system that allocates dis-
tricting power to one political group, districting will always be race-
conscious. In the context of the Voting Rights Act, this conscious-
ness is exacerbated. Where officials responsible for districting his-
torically might have concentrated on partisan concerns, the specter
of the Act will force them to consider race as well. Districting be-
comes more complicated when a district must not only protect in-
cumbents, but also must empower minorities and look attractive on
paper. Of these desires, the goal of increasing minority representa-
43. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct., at 2826 ("[The legislature always is aware of race when it
draws district lines."); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986)("District lines are
rarely neutral phenomena.").
44. The Republican Party's apparently strange fixation on voting rights litigation
in the '80s and '90s reflects a realization of the political nature of districting. In the
redistricting following the 1990 census results, Chicago Republicans joined forces with
African-American and Hispanic civil rights activists. Although their claimed inten-
tion was to create a new Hispanic district out of three districts represented by white
incumbents, partisan politics played a significant role. Republicans were eager to di-
lute white Democrats out of minority districts and into Republican suburban districts.
The final scheme resulted in the retirement of one of the white incumbents and two
races between the other white incumbents. Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and
the American Regulatory State, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINoarrv VOTING supra note
14.
45. See Still, supra note 12, at 251 (describing two sophisticated districts that ma-
nipulate composition in favor of the majority without appearing suspicious).
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tion is politically the most expendable, unless the mandates of the
Voting Rights Act intervene.
Both of the traditional assumptions underlying districting, geog-
raphy and fairness, generally prove to be inaccurate. Because of
these inaccuracies, districts are not as effective in promoting minor-
ity empowerment as advocates would hope.
B. Districting Effects
Although race-conscious districting has increased minority rep-
resentation, its effects on long-term empowerment are debatable.
Even proponents of the goals of race-conscious districting fear that
such districts waste too many minority votes, produce less effective
representatives and increase factionalism. This section examines
and refutes each of these criticisms and demonstrates that race-
conscious districting remains the most viable means of minority
empowerment.
1. Do Majority-Minority Districts Waste Votes?
Voting rights advocates who criticize race-conscious districting
assert that because districting is prone to partisan abuses, single-
member districts waste minority votes when they pack more voters
within a district than are necessary to carry the district.46 Support-
ers of this view favor "influence" districts over majority-minority
districts. Influence districts are those in which the minority popula-
tion is not large enough to form a majority and elect a representa-
tive of its choice, but is large enough to act as "swing" vote in close
elections. 47 While the group might gain less representatives of its
46. Guinier, Groups, Representation and Race-Conscious Districting, supra note
10, at 1613.
Professor Lani Guinier has also recognized that race-conscious districting wastes
votes because it depends upon a "winner take all" philosophy in which losing votes
count for nothing. The losing voter must rely on "virtual representation," vicarious
representation by like-minded successful candidates in neighboring districts. In a sys-
tem that creates a finite number of minority districts, any minority voter living outside
the boundaries of one of those districts receives no direct representation by a candi-
date of her choice.
The efficacy of virtual representation is a necessary assumption to even the fairest
of districting systems. In every district a significant percentage of the electorate will
not have voted for the winning candidate. Whether those voters are adequately
served by neighboring representatives of similar interests raises many questions that
are beyond the scope of this Note and therefore will not be discussed here. See Lani
Guinier, Keeping the Faith: African-American Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 427, nn. 152-53 (1989).
47. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993); Seamon v. Upham, 536 F.
Supp. 931, 949 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
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choice, its vote would factor into the results of several districts. In
a majority-minority district, designers frequently draw lines so that
one minority group forms as much as 70% of a district's popula-
tion. 8 Because only 51% of the voting electorate is necessary to
win an election, a significant number of excess votes that could
have supported a preferred candidate in a neighboring district lose
their effect. Thus, although minority voters are guaranteed a rep-
resentative of their choice in one district, they cannot form a per-
centage of the electorate significant enough to affect electoral
outcomes in neighboring districts.4 9
Packing is a legitimate danger of race-conscious districting, but it
can be prevented. The preclearance procedure of the Voting
Rights Act ensures that states and municipalities justify all district-
ing plans before obtaining approval from the Justice Department.50
Districting experts have become a major factor in districting litiga-
tion; they testify as to (i) the level of racially polarized voting
within a community and (ii) the necessary racial composition of an
effective majority-minority district. The testimony of these experts
lessens the chance that a majority-minority district can be packed.
Abuse may always lead to "wasted votes," but the impact of that
abuse can be minimized. Efforts should focus on that minimization
rather than on eliminating the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts entirely.
2. Have Minority Representatives Been Effective?
Critics of race-based districting also question whether elected
minority representatives have been effective. Arguments in favor
of authentic representation l for minority groups profess that a mi-
nority group member will have a greater psychological bond with
constituents and will be more sympathetic to the needs of the mi-
nority group.5 2 Thus, the representative should be more effective,
and her presence should inspire other minority group members to
participate in the political process, thus reducing group feelings of
alienation. 3 Critics, however, point to several factors that impair
48. See Seamon, 536 F. Supp. at 951 (studying a Texas congressional plan in which
three of the districts included minority populations of greater than 70%).
49. See Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Postscript: What is the Best
Route to a Color Blind Society?, in CoNrrOVERSIES IN MINoRrrv VOTING, supra note
14, at 310-14.
50. See infra part III.A for a discussion of the Voting Rights Act.
51. See supra note 19 for an explanation of the term authentic representation.
52. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 19, at 1106.
53. See id. at 1109-12 (summarizing the "mobilization assumption," which assumes
that authentic representation promotes participation).
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these results. They claim that the mere presence of an authentic
representative does not empower a minority group unless that
member can effectively serve the community, 4 and that although
members of a racial group are likely to believe that a representa-
tive from their own group will best represent them, that is not al-
ways the case.
A representative must overcome her minority status within the
legislature. Professor Guinier has noted that using gerrymandered
districts to increase minority representation results in gerry-
mandered legislatures. 55 Authentic representatives may have diffi-
culty influencing white colleagues because the white
representatives do not need to consider the needs of the compart-
mentalized African-American electorate. 56 The white representa-
tives' districts are overwhelmingly white because most of the
African-American voters have been districted into majority-Afri-
can-American districts.57 The same polarization that occurs within
the electorate will occur within the legislature, and because the Af-
rican-American representative is still in the minority, she will con-
sistently be outvoted.58
Empirical evidence, however, contradicts this view. First, while a
single African-American representative in Congress might have a
negligible influence on policy decisions, the presence of just one
minority representative can have substantial influence on a smaller
legislative body such as a school board or town council. Not only
may the presence of that person change the other members' per-
ceptions about minority group members, but also it is likely that
the other members will need to bargain with the minority member
to gain her support on certain issues. In a larger body, such as the
House of Representatives, a large enough number of minority rep-
resentatives may be elected to vote as a block and influence the
process. In this event, the minority coalition will become more
powerful, and white representatives will be forced to bargain with
the minority caucus.59 Furthermore, the minority caucus will be-
54. Id. at 1116-18 (examining situations in which mere presence of black legisla-
tors may not always empower minority voters).
55. Id. at 1126.
56. Id. at 1126 ("Blacks elected from black single-member districts are less em-
powered to influence their white colleagues, whose homogeneous white single-mem-
ber district base enables them to ignore black interests without electoral
consequences.").
57. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 19, at 1106.
58. Id. at 1116.
59. Frank Parker has reported that in Mississippi, while whites still control the
legislature by a wide margin, a powerful African-American caucus has developed. As
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come strong enough to expose the majority to the issues important
to the minority community.60
Additionally, the ineffectiveness argument ignores the positive
effect that the mere presence of authentic representatives has on
minority communities. While it is important that representatives
attain material benefits for their constituents, there is an added
public benefit gained by the presence of minority officeholders.61
As Judge Higginbotham has expressed: "[a] Congress with mem-
bers of all colors brings more American citizens into the political
system, as it announces that government is for all Americans, in-
creases the confidence of all American voters in the government,
and thereby cultivates political participation of all Americans. "62
3. Does Race-Conscious Districting Breed Factionalism?
Critics also contend that race-conscious districting will breed fac-
tions and aggravate racial schisms within society. In Shaw v.
Reno,63 Justice O'Connor articulated the fear that districts born out
of the Voting Rights Act would set back rather than promote a
"color blind"' society. Justice O'Connor's reservations mirror
that of many critics of the Voting Rights Act: that redistricting has
become a form of resegregation. 65
Theoretically, the majority-minority single-member districts cre-
ated pursuant to the Voting Rights Act breed factions through a
lack of compromise. 66 A randomly drawn district will be heteroge-
neous enough to force all groups to compromise with one another
near the center of the spectrum.67 In majority-minority districts,
of 1988, only 20 out of 122 members of the Mississippi House were African-American.
Yet the consensus among the African-American representatives and veteran white
representatives was that when the African-American representatives voted as a block
they were able to influence major legislation. Further they were able to invoke cer-
tain procedures that did not require a majority vote, such as removing a bill from the
House calendar. They also had been able to secure influential committee appoint-
ments. FRANK PARKER, BLACK VOTES CouNT 134-35 (1990).
60. See Higginbotham et al., supra note 2, at 1637 (listing issues of particular im-
portance to African-Americans).61. Luis Fraga, Latino Political Incorporation and the Voting Rights Act, in CON-
TROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 14, at 278, 280.
62. Higginbotham et al., supa note 2, at 1637-38 (emphasis in original).
63. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
64. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting)("Our
constitution is color-blind,, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
65. See Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 227 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (Eisele, J.)("Do
we really believe in the idea of one political society or should this be a nation of
separate racial, ethnic, and language political enclaves?").
66. THERNSTROM, supra note 22, at 192-244.
67. Polsby & Popper, The Third Criterion, supra note 42, at 306.
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however, the homogeneous electorate will elect representatives
who do not need support from a wide spectrum of the community
and therefore are unlikely to compromise with others.68 Thus, ac-
cording to its critics, the.Voting Rights Act encourages groups to
remain fractious rather than to build coalitions with one another.
Of all the claimed ill effects of race-conscious districting, the
threat of increased factionalism is the least accurate. As one com-
mentator has written, the changes mandated by the Voting Rights
Act "simply reflect already existing cleavages within the polity: the
cleavages are not necessarily a function of the changes. ' 69 Critics
have seized upon the unproven possibility that segregated districts
where representatives need not compromise will become the norm,
instead of the more likely outcome that integrated legislatures will
develop and legislators will learn to compromise with one another.
In order for minority representatives to succeed, they must com-
promise. Minority representatives are no doubt as interested in
political self-preservation as their white counterparts. They will
work as hard as white representatives to bring material benefits
home to their constituencies, and because they do not constitute
the majority, minority legislators must work with white legislatures
in order to secure those benefits. Therefore, they will convince
white legislators that what is good for the minority is also good for
the majority.70
The idea that the above-stated effects limit the efficacy of race-
conscious districting has resulted in a backlash against the use of
remedial districting and against the Voting Rights Act. Because
the Act has evolved from its original goal of providing access to the
ballot to the much broader goal of empowerment, it has stirred
controversy.
68. Id. at 307. Some may consider this lack of compromise as a positive rather
than negative factor. After all, a minority representative who is forced to compromise
with the white majority often will have less time or ability to serve his constituents'
needs. More importantly, he will have to depend on the whims of white voters to
remain in office. Yet, if the overall goal of voting rights jurisprudence is to give mi-
norities an effective voice within government, then representatives of each minority
group will have to learn to compromise not only with white representatives, but with
each other as well. A system that settles for token minority representatives who re-
main in the minority on representative bodies and do not have to form coalitions with
other representatives will not achieve that goal.
69. Fraga, supra note 61, at 279.
70. Id. at 281-82.
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HI. Development of Voting Rights Act as Remedy of
Vote Dilution
This Part examines the history of the Voting Rights Act and its
development as a means of combatting vote dilution. As passed in
1965, it was tremendously successful in providing equal access to
the ballot.71 States employed dilutive devices, however, to emascu-
late the force of the Act and of the African-American vote, deny-
ing African-American voters an equal influence in the political
process.72 Thus, in its earliest form the Act ensured political equal-
ity but not political empowerment. 73 After plaintiffs challenged
several multi-member districting plans with varying levels of suc-
cess,74 Congress amended the Act in 1982 so that it would prohibit
vote dilution.75 Section A below traces the Act and the vote dilu-
tion cases brought prior to its 1982 amendment. Section B summa-
rizes the amendment and the standard for vote dilution that
developed thereafter.'
71. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 14, at 1421 (characterizing the political
equality vision as insuring that African-Americans "be afforded the right to vote, and
[that] their vote ... count[s] as much as that of whites").
72. There are a number of common dilution schemes. Majority requirements
forced run-off elections when neither candidate won a majority of the vote. In cases
where an African-American candidate had won a plurality against two white candi-
dates, a run-off required the African-American candidate to run against a single white
candidate who would usually then gain the entire white vote and easily win. Chandler
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CoNrraovERsIEs IN MINORITY
VOTING, supra note 14, at 7, 23 n.56.
Anti-single shot rules prohibited voters from voting for fewer candidates than there
are offices to be elected. Such provisions frustrated the one tactic minority voters
used to increase the power of their votes in a multi-member district. Abigail Them-
strom offers an example of successful single-shot voting: "[Iln a field of thirteen candi-
dates with five seats to be filled and one black candidate, if blacks bullet vote for the
single black candidate [that is, if each black voter casts all five of her votes for the
black candidate], they deprive white candidates of potential votes and thus aid the
Black." THERNSTROM, supra note 22 at 303, 305.
73. Guinier, No 7ivo Seats, supra note 14, at 1422 (characterizing political empow-
erment as the possession of an equally meaningful vote).
74. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 401 U.S. 124 (1971); Bums v. Richardson, 385 U.S.
73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
75. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (discussing the 1982 amendments
to the Voting Rights Act).
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A. The Voting Rights Act and the Early, Defense Against Vote
Dilution Claims
The Voting Rights Act has been called the most successful piece
of legislation of the "second Reconstruction."76 Passed in 1965 to
enforce the voting guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment,77 its
two most important provisions were Section 2 and Section 5. Sec-
tion 2, the Act's enforcement provision, echoed the words of the
Fifteenth Amendment.78 Section 5 prohibited the implementation
of any changes in voting procedure in "covered '79 jurisdictions
without that jurisdiction first obtaining Justice Department
preclearance80 To obtain preclearance, the proposed changes
could not have the purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color."81
76. Davidson, supra note 72, at 7. Southern historian C. Vann Woodward coined
the term "second Reconstruction" to describe the movement following the Second
World War which led to the eradication of legalized segregation in the South. C.
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 8-10 (3d. ed. 1974). Wood-
ward divides the era into two distinct periods. During the first the judicial and execu-
tive branches of the federal government initiated reforms while Congress and the
general public "remained largely unresponsive." Id. at 135. During the second pe-
riod, the South organized massive resistance to the movement which "aroused popu-
lar support and stirred Congress into unprecedented and effective action." Id.
77. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have
power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
§§1,2.
78. Davidson, supra note 72, at 17.
79. A jurisdiction is covered for the purposes of Section 5 if it falls within one of
the following categories: (1) it maintained a test or device as a condition for register-
ing or voting on November 1, 1964, and less than 50% of its total voting-age popula-
tion was registered or actually voted in the 1964 presidential election; (2) it
maintained a test or device as a condition for registering or voting on November 1,
1968, and less than 50% of its total voting-age population was registered or actually
voted in the 1968 presidential election; and (3) more than 5% of the citizens of voting
age in the jurisdiction were members of a single language minority group on Novem-
ber 1, 1972, and less than 50% of the citizens of voting age had been registered or had
voted in the 1972 presidential election. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988). The Act provides that the covered state or polit-
ical subdivision may seek approval for a proposed change by instituting an action for
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
but may avoid that proceeding by obtaining preclearance of the change from the At-
torney General's Office. Id. Because most jurisdictions forgo the former option and
opt for the latter, the phrase "Justice Department preclearance" is generally used to
refer to the Section 5 process.
81. The Supreme Court has liberally construed the provision so that preclearance
is now required for a variety of changes. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526
(1973) (redistricting); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1972) (annex-
ations); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (changes in location of polling
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Since 1975, the Justice Department has based its Section 5
preclearance decisions on the "non-retrogression" principle estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Beer v. United States.82 Under
Beer, the threshold measure of the effect of a change is whether the
change results in a retrogression of the group's preexisting voting
rights.8 3 A change that increases a group's rights, even if it falls
short of the maximum change that could occur, does not violate
Section 5 unless it discriminates on the basis of race or color in
violation of the Constitution." For instance, if a state whose cur-
rent Congressional districting plan includes one majority-minority
district out of ten total districts is granted an additional Congres-
sional seat following a census, it will have to design a new plan
composed of eleven seats. If, in considering various new plans, the
state determined that it could draw three majority-minority dis-
tricts, but chose instead to draw two, the plan would not violate the
non-retrogression principle for its failure to include as many major-
ity-minority districts as practicable, as long as the overall voting
strength of the minority group was not weakened.
The Act immediately increased African-American voter registra-
tion, especially in the South,8 5 but could not overcome the vote
dilution schemes that confronted African-American voters. Afri-
can-American voters who felt shut out of the political process
could only challenge dilutive voting procedures on Equal Protec-
tion grounds-an uncertain and lengthy procedure. 6 Although
the Supreme Court had stated that in some cases, multi-member
districts would be subject to challenge if they diluted a group's vot-
places); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (shift from districts to at-
large system). Drew S. Days, III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 14, at 52, 54.
82. 425 U.S. 130 (1975).
83. Id. at 141.
84. Id.
.85. Justice Department estimates showed that in the five years immediately fol-
lowing passage of the Act, almost as many African-Americans registered in Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina and South Carolina as in the entire
century before 1965. Davidson, supra note 72, at 21.
86. Id. at 37. Plaintiffs were compelled to hire experts to gather the needed evi-
dence in such cases. Vital information included historical evidence on government
responsiveness to a particular community, race relations within a jurisdiction, the ef-
fects of past election requirements and procedures, voter registration and turnout and
voting patterns within specific racial or ethnic enclaves and throughout the commu-
nity as a whole. Id. The burden of proof was daunting and plaintiffs faced the
likelihood of lengthy appeals.
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ing power,87 many years passed before a clear standard emerged
for establishing unconstitutional vote dilution within those
districts."8
When the Court finally sustained a challenge to a multi-member
district in White v. Regester in 1973,89 it did so not because "every
racial or political group has a constitutional right to be represented
in the state legislature," but because the "totality of the circum-
stances" indicated that the multi-member plan at issue had ex-
cluded the plaintiffs "from effective participation in political life
.... ,,90 Thus, the Court focused on the results of the multi-member
plan rather than on the intent of the state legislature in establishing
the plan.
The success of White was relatively short-lived. In 1980, the
Court struck a major blow to vote dilution challenges with City of
Mobile v. Bolden.91 In Bolden, the Court held that plaintiffs mak-
87. Burns v. Richardson, 385 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (supposing that the invidious ef-
fect referred to in Fortson could be more easily shown if "districts are large in relation
to the total number of legislators, if districts are not appropriately subdistricted to
assure distribution of legislators that are resident over the entire district,. or if such
districts characterize both houses of a bicameral legislature rather than one"); Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,439 (1965) ("It might well be that.., a multi-member constit-
uency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population").
88. For some time, the ability to challenge a multi-member district appeared ethe-
real at best. While the Court had stated that minority plaintiffs could successfully
challenge a multi-member district if they proved that the district impeded their ability
to participate in the political process, it was reluctant to find that a group's inability to
elect the representative of its choice established that proof. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 401
U.S. 124, 153 (1971)(characterizing the plaintiffs' claim of vote cancellation as "a mere
euphemism for political defeat at the polls").
89. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). White was not the first time the Court had struck down a
multi-member plan because of its dilutive effects. Four days prior to the Whitcomb
decision in 1971, the Court decided Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), which
invalidated a court-designed multi-member plan for Hinds County, Mississippi. In so
doing, the Court established the "Connor rule" requiring single-member districts in
court-ordered plans nationwide, regardless of whether the established plan diluted
minority voting. The Court had more latitude over court-ordered plans because of its
general power to supervise lower court proceedings. Further, because such plans
were not enacted by state legislatures, the Court was not required to show the defer-
ence it would for state policies and procedures, nor were plaintiffs required to meet
the heavier burden of proving a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See generally
PARKER, supra note 59, at 106-24 (chronicling early challenges to multi-member dis-
trict plans).
90. White, 412 U.S. at 769-70 (declining to overturn the District Court's judgment
for the plaintiffs because it represented "a blend of history and an intensely local
appraisal of the design and impact" of the districts at issue "in light of past and pres-
ent reality").
91. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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ing a claim under the Constitution or Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act had to show that a state had instituted or maintained a
contested practice with discriminatory intent.92 Departing from
the result-oriented test of White, the plurality asserted that only
purposeful discrimination could violate the Equal Protection
Clause. a The Bolden decision set a prohibitively high standard for
proving vote dilution. In some instances, proving discriminatory
intent would require an evidentiary showing of the motives under-
lying dilution schemes that had been in existence for nearly a
century.94
B. Congress Responds to Bolden: The 1982 Amendments
The timing of Bolden could not have been more auspicious for
the voting rights movement. In 1982, the original Section 5
preclearance provisions of the Act were due to expire, meaning
that "covered" jurisdictions would be free to change their electoral
systems without Justice Department interference. That expiration
alone would have substantially paralyzed the movement against di-
lution, but considering the Bolden decision, expiration appeared
even more threatening. The Bolden controversy triggered a move-
ment that led not only to the codification of the White result-ori-
ented test but also to a twenty-five year extension of Section 5.95
Congress amended Section 2 so that it could accomplish more
than just the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. As
amended, it prohibited the application of any "voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure ... in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right" to
vote.96 Voters no longer had to prove intentional discrimination in
92. Bernard Grofman has noted that the Court's handling of Equal Protection
claims in other contexts indicated that it might adopt an intent standard for proving
vote dilution. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that "the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"). BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 141 n.10 (1992).
93. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66.
94. Davidson, supra note 72, at 38.
95. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Repre-
sentation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 14, at 66, 67.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 2, as codified and amended, reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contra-
vention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
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order to prevail on a Section 2 claim.97 Instead, they needed only
to show that "based on the totality of the circumstances," the mem-
bers of the minority group had less opportunity than others "to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice."98 Congress specifically rejected the idea, however,
that the amendments were to ensure any form of proportional rep-
resentation.99 Further, it provided no bright-line standard for dilu-
tion upon which courts could rely. The Supreme Court established
that bright line in Thornburg v. Gingles.1°°
Gingles illustrates the inherent conflict between the political em-
powerment of African-American voters and the Voting Rights
Act's explicit prohibition against exactly proportional representa-
tion. The Court attempted to resolve this conflict through the de-
velopment of a simpler test for vote dilution, similar to the "one
person, one vote" test. Based on the legislative history of the
amended statute, the majority established a three-part test to de-
termine when at-large voting within a multi-member district vio-
lated Section 2. First, the minority group challenging the multi-
member district must show that it is sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact to form a majority in a single-member dis-
trict.101 Second, the minority group must show that it is politically
cohesive. 1°2 Third, the minority group must prove that the white
majority, when voting as a bloc, is able to regularly defeat the mi-
nority's preferred candidate.10 3 The plurality defined racial bloc
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsec-
tion (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this sec-
tion establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in num-
bers equal to their proportion in the population.
97. The Amendments only eliminated the intent requirement for proving a Sec-
tion 2 violation. The Bolden decision retained its force in that it also established that
a showing of intent was necessary to bring a successful Equal Protection challenge to
dilutive district plans.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
99. Id.
100. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
101. Id. at 50.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 50-51.
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voting as "black voters and white voters voting differently,"'1 4 and
simplified the standard for proving such voting patterns.
The Gingles test remains the standard for proving vote dilution.
It has simplified the litigation process by limiting the discovery
needed to prove or disprove such claims. Its focus on racial pat-
terns in elections and demographics has provided a much more
concrete basis for stating a, claim than its predecessor, the intent
test of Bolden, which required inquiry into social and historical fac-
tors. Because dilution is now easier to prove, states and municipal-
ities have been more likely to settle claims out Of court or to
change their districting systems before a challenge arises. Thus, di-
lution litigation is now cheaper and less likely to be appealed.10 5
Overall, the amendments and the Gingles test led, in the 1980s,
to a substantial amount of redistricting designed to empower mi-
nority voters. Multi-member district plans were struck down as
courts ordered states and counties to create majority-minority sin-
gle-member districts. These new districts enabled groups that
would have been outvoted by the majority in a multi-member sys-
tem to elect representatives of their choice in single-member dis-
tricts in which their population was large enough to form the
majority. This emerging focus on single-member districts as an em-
powerment tool, however, led to new controversies.
The Justice Department, acting under Section 5, approved new
districts even if they lacked the traditional districting criterion of
geographical compactness.' ° As the use of more irregular looking
districts became increasingly widespread, it was inevitable that
challenges would arise. Shaw v. Reno was just such a challenge and
has threatened the future of race-conscious districting.
104. Id. at 53 n.21. The plurality used the terms "racial bloc" voting and "racially
polarized" voting interchangeably.
105. McDonald, supra note 95, at 70-71. McDonald uses South Carolina as an ex-
ample of the post-Gingles change in litigation. In Edgefield County, South Carolina,
a challenge to at-large elections was filed in 1974. Litigation lasted more than ten
years, including an appeal before the Supreme Court. A similar suit was filed in 1985.
Following Gingles and a trial court judgment for the plaintiffs, the county decided not
to appeal. Additional suits were then filed against the two largest towns in the
county, which both settled out of court. Id. at 71.
106. See John R. Dunne, Redistricting in the 1990's: The New York Example, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1993)(noting that in making preclearance decisions,
the Civil Rights Division does not reject oddly shaped districts as long as they do not
dilute minority voting rights).
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IV. The Future of Race-Conscious Districting
The Shaw v. Reno decision illustrates that the Court does not
favor the pervasive use of race-conscious districting as a remedy
for vote dilution.10 7 Commentators have noted that Shaw follows a
trend by the Court to de-contextualize Equal Protection analysis in
order to promote a "color blind" Constitution. 08 Although the ef-
fect of Shaw is not yet clear, subsequent lower court decisions re-
veal a willingness to invalidate many single-member districts.
A. Shaw v. Reno: Establishing the Right to a "Color Blind"
Electoral Process
Shaw v. Reno provided the stage for the inevitable confrontation
between the Equal Protection Clause and the three-prong Gingles
test.' 9 A divided Court' 10 held that the plaintiffs, white citizens of
North Carolina, had stated a valid Equal Protection claim "by al-
leging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reap-
portionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can only be
recognized as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting dis-
tricts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.""! The majority, without deciding whether "the in-
tentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more" al-
ways gives rise to an Equal Protection claim, found that the
plaintiffs had stated a justiciable claim.1 2
The North Carolina Assembly had designed the contested plan
in the redistricting that followed the 1990 census." 3 Pursuant to
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Assembly submitted it to
107. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
108. Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Act Juris-
prudence, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1409, 1410 n.8 (arguing that "Shaw ... will intensify the
trend away from a historical concern with the social and political subordination of
blacks, toward a de-contextualized Equal Protection analysis that purports to place all
groups on the same footing").
109. 113 S. Ct. 2816. See also supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing
the Gingles standard for establising vote dilution).
110. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined.
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter filed separate dissenting opinions.
111. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
112. Id.
113. Because the 1990 census results indicated a population increase, the state was
awarded a twelfth seat in the United States House of Representatives. Accordingly,
the General Assembly passed legislation redistricting the state into twelve districts.
Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
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the U.S. Attorney General's Office for approval.114 The Attorney
General's Office formally objected to the initial plan, which in-
cluded one majority-African-American district. The Office de-
cided that the Assembly could have created a second majority-
minority district in the south-central to southeastern portion of the
state, but failed to do so "for pretextual reasons."'1 5 The General
Assembly then submitted a second plan that included two major-
ity-minority districts, the first district, which had been in the origi-
nal plan and the newly created twelfth district, located in the north
central region of the state.
District 1, the original majority-minority district, was somewhat
oddly shaped,l" 6 but did not inspire the derision reserved for Dis-
trict 12, which was was approximately 160 miles long, stretching
alongside Interstate 85. The majority described the district as fol-
lows: "It winds in snake-like fashion through tobacco country, fi-
nancial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbles in
enough enclaves of African-American neighborhoods.' "17
The plaintiffs' claim was not one of vote dilution but one alleging
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the Court
did not apply the Gingles test because application of Section 2 was
not necessary." 8 The Court instead studied whether the plaintiffs
even had a valid claim in asserting that the districting plan unlaw-
fully segregated voters. In so doing, the Court did not condemn all
use of race in districting, conceding that "the legislature always is
114. Forty out of the one hundred North Carolina counties are covered by Section
5. Because the redistricting affected covered counties, the plan required preclearance.
Id. at 463.
115. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
116. The shape of District 1 has been described as a "bug splattered on a wind-
shield." Review and Outlook: Political Pornography-ll, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at
A14.
117. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821 (citations omitted). Other commentators were no
kinder in assessing the district. See Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes To Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything,
It's the Only Thing?" 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1261 (1993)("a very slender worm
with unsightly bulges"); Timothy M. Phelps, Minority District Challenge, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 31, 1993, at 17 ("boa-constrictor like"). A more sweeping, and less accurate
assessment called the district "the most flagrant example of racial gerrymandering on
the U.S. political map." Elizabeth McCaughey, Stopping Racial Gerrymandering,
U.S.A. TODAY, June 29, 1993. Finally, the most humorous commentary has been at-
tributed to Mickey Michaux, one of the candidates for Congress in District 12 in 1992:
"I love the district because I can drive down 1-85 with both car doors open and hit
every person in the district." THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITCS, North Caro-
lina, Twelfth District 968 (1994).
118. See supra. notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing the Gingles stan-
dard for establishing vote dilution).
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aware of race when it draws district lines . . ... 119 Rather, the
Court focused on the special harms that could result if race became
too significant a factor in district design. By focusing on the degree
to which race was a factor in the design of majority-minority dis-
tricts, the Court treated these districts as a form of segregation that
"threaten special harms not present in vote dilution cases,"' 2 and
thus divorced this claim from prior vote dilution claims. The
Court's discussion focused on the potential harms of majority-mi-
nority districts in general, rather than on the specific harms of the
North Carolina plan.
For two reasons, the Court summarily rejected the notion that a
remedial single-member majority-minority district should be held
to less Constitutional scrutiny than other racial classifications.
First, it noted the general proposition promoted in Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., that Equal Protection analysis "is not dependent
on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classifi-
cation.'1' Second, the Court addressed majority-minority districts
directly and concluded that they cause the same harms as other
racial classifications and therefore should be treated accordingly. 22
For example, these plans promote racial stereotypes, which "rein-
force[ I the perception that members of the same racial group-
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the commu-
nity in which they live-think alike, share the same political inter-
ests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls," and thus
exacerbate rather than ameliorate racial polarization in voting. 23
Additionally, the Court claimed that majority-minority districts en-
courage elected officials to pander to a particular racial group at
the expense of the rest of their constituency. 24 The Court con-
cluded that some majority-minority districts bear "an uncomforta-
ble resemblance to political apartheid.' 1 25 In light of all these
potential harms, the Court held, in the spirit of Croson, that ra-
cially gerrymandered districts would be held to the same strict
scrutiny standard as other classifications based on race. The Court
concluded that "[riacial gerrymandering, even for remedial pur-
119. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 2828.
121. Id. at 2829 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)(plurality opinion)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2827.
124. 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
125. Id. The Court classified the voters of Districts 1 and 12 as "widely separated
by geographic and political boundaries" and as having "little in common with each
other but the color of their skin." Id.
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poses, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens
to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race
no longer matters .... It is for these reasons that race-based dis-
tricting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.' '1 26
The Court established that more than one type of evidence
would suffice to prove that a district had been impermissibly ra-
cially motivated. Plaintiffs could offer direct evidence that a dis-
trict had been intended as an express racial classification, 127 but the
Court recognized that such evidence would be rarely available. Al-
ternatively, therefore, the majority opinion noted instances where
inferential evidence would be sufficient proof of a racial
motivation.
The majority noted two instances where a court could infer a
suspect racial gerrymander. The easier case exists where a plan is
"so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be under-
stood as anything other than an effort to segregat[e] ... voters on
the basis of race."' 28 A second, less obvious case would be where a
state designs a districting plan without regard to the traditional dis-
tricting principles of compactness, contiguity and respect for polit-
ical subdivisions. 129 Disregard for these principles does not render
a districting plan per se unconstitutional, because their application
is not constitutionally required, but such disregard does serve as
probative evidence of unconstitutionality.130
Although the Court declined to rule on whether North Carolina
had demonstrated a sufficiently compelling state interest for de-
signing the contested districts, the opinion suggests that it would
have found the interests likely to be offered by the State less than
compelling. First, although the majority conceded that the State
has a strong interest in complying with Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, it stressed that courts have never given covered juris-
dictions "carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the
name of non-retrogression.' 31 Therefore, while the state may
have had a strong interest in complying with the non-retrogression
126. Id. at 2832.
127. Id. at 2824 ("No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial
classification appears on the face of the statute.")(citing Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
128. Id. at 2826-27 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1964)).
129. Id. at 2827.
130. Id. ("We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are con-
stitutionally required-they are not-but because they are objective factors that may
serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.").
131. Id. at 2831 ("A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the
goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably neces-
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principle, it would not have a strong interest in designing more ma-
jority-minority districts than necessary. As for compliance with
Section 2, the Court stated only that the State would have to sur-
vive the Gingles test 132 in order to satisfy strict scrutiny, and that
the issue was left open for remand. 33 Second, the majority
doubted that a District Court would hold eradication of past dis-
crimination to be a compelling state interest., The Court theorized
that in the likely event that the District Court found that North
Carolina had exceeded the requirements of 'the Act, the State
would be unable to prove that past racial discrimination within the
State had been so severe as to warrant that excessive remedial
action. 34
The four dissenting Justices argued that the majority opinion ig-
nored the fact that a valid Equal Protection claim generally re-
quires a showing of discriminatory effect. 135 As Justice White
pointed out in his dissent, voting rights jurisprudence has estab-
lished that a group alleging an Equal Protection violation must
prove that its members have been "shut out of the political
process.' '1 36
In examining the Equal Protection claim, Justice Souter opined
that vote dilution is the only harm that unconstitutional districting
can cause. 137 According to Justice Souter, unlike other racially
based state decisions, a districting plan does not necessarily benefit
members of one race at the expense of another. 38 A person's indi-
vidual right to representation is not infringed when that person is
drawn into or out of a particular district. A district only becomes
sary to avoid retrogression.") (emphasis added). See also supra notes 82-84 and ac-
companying text (discussing the nonretrogression principle).
132. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing the Gingles stan-
dard for establishing vote dilution).
133. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
134. Id. at 2832. The Court bases this standard on City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)(plurality opinion), which held that in eradicating the effects
of past racial discrimination, a State must have a "strong basis in evidence for [con-
cluding] that remedial action [is] necessary." Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. The Court
apparently is not persuaded by the Justice Department's opinion that forty of North
Carolina's one hundred counties engaged in sufficiently discriminatory election proce-
dures to warrant Section 5 coverage.
135. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 n.4 (White, J., dissenting)(explaining that the posi-
tion taken by the majority in this case conflicts with that established in Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
136. 113 S. Ct. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting)(quoting Bandemer, 478 U;S. at 139
(1986)(plurality opinion)).
137. Id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting)(distinguishing districting from decisions that
deny one person a right or benefit that is provided to another person).
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unconstitutional when it affects the political power of an entire
group. 139 Justice Souter argued that if an apportionment scheme
does not threaten a group's ability to "participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of its choice," then from an
effects basis, no wrong has occurred, and concluded that the major-
ity based its finding on appearance rather than effect. 14°
The majority in Shaw compensates for the lack of discriminatory
effect by creating a standard that eliminates the effect requirement
if a district looks sufficiently irregular.141 This standard disingenu-
ously stresses the appearance of districts over the harm resulting
from them. As Justices Stevens and White acknowledged, the
shape of a district is relevant only to the extent that it may show
some discriminatory intent, and when intent is not the issue, shape
has less significance. 142 Justice Stevens elaborated that a gerryman-
der becomes unconstitutional not when it takes on a certain shape,
but when it serves to "enhance the power of the group in control of
the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and
thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral
power.' 1 43 Finally, the dissenters argued that the majority opinion,
by focusing on appearance, misstates the potential harm of gerry-
mandered districts. 144 Districts are not harmful because they look
unusual but because they are designed to serve an unconstitutional
purpose. 145
Shaw constitutionalized the arguments against race-conscious
districting' 46 by fitting them under the mantle of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Indeed, there may be some relation between single-
member districts and the racial stereotyping, electioneering and
"political apartheid" Justice O'Connor warns against. Unfortu-
nately, she reversed the cause and effect relationship; those dan-
gers are not the effect of race-conscious districting, but rather have
139. Id. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Elaine Jones of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund has labeled this the
"Looks Funny" standard of Equal Protection. Both Sides with Jesse Jackson (CNN
Television Broadcast, July 3, 1993).
142. This view was espoused by Justices White and Stevens in separate dissents.
White remarked that irregularities in design "have no bearing on whether the plan
ultimately is found to violate the Constitution." 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Stevens found that because the State's intent in creating the two districts was
clearly to abide by the Attorney General's ruling, the shape of the districts was irrele-
vant to this claim. Id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. See also id. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. See supra part II.
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limited the success of minority candidates for decades, causing leg-
islatures to draw majority-minority districts in an effort to compen-
sate for that limitation.
Initially, there was some thought that Shaw might have little ef-
fect on districting. Justices White and Souter both predicted that
the majority holding would be limited to situations where a district
looked particularly bizarre.147 The lower court decisions interpret-
ing Shaw, however, have contradicted this view.
B. Following Shaw. The District Court Responses
Shaw held that a racially gerrymandered majority-minority dis-
trict would be subject to strict scrutiny, but the Supreme Court did
not itself apply the strict scrutiny test to the North Carolina plan;
instead it remanded the suit to the district court for further consid-
eration. To date, four district courts have heard Shaw claims, three
of which are noteworthy. 148 Courts have expressed some difficulty
in interpreting Shaw,'149 and while for the most part they have
looked to other race-based remedial action cases for guidance, 50
they have approached the analysis of Shaw claims differently. This
section will first discuss what circumstances in fact trigger strict
scrutiny, and then how the courts have applied strict scrutiny in
race-conscious districting cases.
147. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting)(stating that the decision
will probably "not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in
favor of racial minorities"); 113 S. Ct. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting)("The district at
issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other[s] . . . are likely to carry the
unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here.").
148. Johnson v. Miller, CIV.A.No. 194-008, 1994 WL 506780 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 12,
1994); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.
Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). The fourth case, Vera v. Richards, No. CIV.A.H-94-
0277, 1994 WL 484492 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1994), also involved a plan struck down as
violative of the Equal Protection clause, but established no new or distinctive stan-
dard for analyzing such a claim.
149. See Johnson v. Miller, CIV.A.No. 194-008, 1994 WL 506780, at *11 (S.D. Ga.
Sept. 12, 1994)(characterizing the Shaw opinion as "a bit less than a riddle wrapped in
an enigma"); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,427 (E.D.N.C. 1994)(conceding that the
threshold showing required to trigger strict scrutiny under Shaw "is not immediately
clear").
150. See generally Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 434 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (addressing the use of racial set-asides in the award
of government contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)(ad-
dressing affirmative action programs in public employment); Regents of the Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)(invalidating medical school's preferred admission
policy for minority students)).
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1. Proof Required to Trigger Strict Scrutiny
All three district courts have relied heavily on the standard es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Dev. Corp.151 In Arlington Heights, the Court held
that strict scrutiny would apply to any legislation in which race has
been shown to be the "substantial" or "motivating" factor, even if
race was not the sole or primary justification for the legislation.152
The district court in Shaw v. Hunt5 3 applied this standard, 154 while
the court in Hays v. Louisiana155 adopted an even broader stan-
dard. The Johnson v. Miller156 court also relied on the "substantial
or motivating" standard, but interpreted it differently than the
Hunt court.
The Hunt court conceded that Shaw's meaning in the strict scru-
tiny context was "not immediately clear," and thus struggled with
the various potential interpretations urged by the competing par-
ties.' 57 The Hunt plaintiffs had urged the court to apply the "sub-
151. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
152. Id. at 265-66.
153. 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
154. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 431 (holding that strict scrutiny will be triggered "by
proof-by any means, including state concession, bizarre shape, or some combination
of the various factors typically used to prove the 'intent' element of an Equal Protec-
tion claim under Arlington Heights" that race played a substantial or motivating role
in the design of the districts). Unlike many other courts and commentators, the Hunt
court stressed that the constitutional offense involved in a claim of this type is not the
bizarre shape of the districts but the deliberate classification of voters by race. Hunt,
861 F. Supp. at 431. According to the court's reading of Shaw, peculiar or ugly
shapes may bear some significance at the strict scrutiny stage, "but only as circumstan-
tial evidence that the disproportionate concentration of members of a particular race
in certain districts was something the line-drawers deliberately set out to accomplish
...." Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 431.
155. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
156. 1994 WL 506780 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
157. See Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 427-28.
The court dismissed outright the State's argument that the plan should be held to
intermediate scrutiny because the State was complying with a federal statute.
Although the court acknowledged this federal mandate, it rejected the argument that
the Plan should be judged under the intermediate scrutiny standard that the Supreme
Court applied to "benign" race-based measures mandated by Congress in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S., 547 (1990), rather than the strict scrutiny standard
applied to such measures when they are undertaken by state and local governments.
Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 435 n.22. The court distinguished the policies at issue in Metro
Broadcasting from the Hunt plan because the Metro policies had been specifically
mandated by Congress, but a districting plan enacted by a state did not carry "the
same imprimatur of congressional approval, even when it is done with the purpose of
complying with the Voting Rights Act or the Justice Department's interpretation
thereof." Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 434 n.22.
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stantial or motivating factor" test,158 while North Carolina argued
that the court should apply strict scrutiny only in the absence of a
race-neutral explanation for the location, shape and composition of
the district.159 While the court admitted that the North Carolina
interpretation was credible, 16° it held that such an interpretation
could not be correct because it would render the Shaw opinion vir-
tually meaningless. In other words, application of North Carolina's
trigger standard would not comply with the Hunt court's interpre-
tation of the Shaw majority's intention "to place race-based redis-
tricting legislation into the same category as all other forms of race-
based state action after Croson, for purposes of analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause . . .. "6
The Shaw v. Hunt court held that a districting plan would trigger
strict scrutiny if the plaintiffs proved that it was deliberately drawn
158. The "substantial" or "motivating" standard derives from Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)(holding that plaintiffs had
failed to prove that a racially discriminatory intent or purpose had motivated a Village
rezoning decision). The Hunt plaintiffs interpreted Shaw to establish that in the vot-
ing rights context, the Arlington Heights test is satisfied by "proof that the lines of a
particular plan were deliberately drawn so as to create one or more districts in which
a particular racial group has a majority, even if factors other than race also played a
substantial role in the location and shape of those districts." See Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at
427 (emphasis added). This interpretation was also adopted by a unanimous opinion
in Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731
(1994).
159. See Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 428. The State urged that a more accurate reading of
Shaw would limit strict scrutiny to plans that "(i) create districts with highly irregular
shapes, (ii) in which citizens of particular racial groups are concentrated in numbers
disproportionate to their representation on the state's population as a whole and (iii)
whose shape and location cannot be rationally explained by reference to any district-
ing factor other than race." Id. Furthermore, while the presence of the first two fac-
tors might give rise to an inference that the plan was gerrymandered, the state would
be able to rebut that finding with evidence that the shape of the districts could be
rationally explained on some other basis. Id. This interpretation would limit applica-
tion of Shaw to "exceptional cases." Id.
160. See Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 428-29. The court advanced two justifications for the
State's interpretation. First, an apparent conflict existed between the plaintiffs' inter-
pretation and the nature of the Supreme Court's remand. Noting that the State had
conceded that race had been a motivating factor in the plan design, the court hypothe-
sized that if the Shaw Court had intended that the deliberate creation of majority-
minority districts was all that was necessary to trigger strict scrutiny, it would have
"note[d] the state's concession, announce[d] that strict scrutiny was therefore applica-
ble, and remand[ed] for application of that standard." Id. at 429. Instead, the Court
suggested that the state might avoid strict scrutiny on remand by producing evidence
that would somehow "'rebut" or "contradict" the allegation of racial gerrymandering.
Id. (citing Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832). Second, the Shaw majority "explicitly reserved
the question whether the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts, without
more, always triggers strict scrutiny." Id. That express disclaimer on the part of the
Court would appear to discredit the plaintiffs' interpretation.
161. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 429.
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to create one or more districts which placed a particular racial
group in the majority, even if factors other than race played a sig-
nificant role in the location and shape of the districts. 62 According
to the court, upon this showing of deliberate racial purpose, the
State would not avoid strict scrutiny by a showing that the districts
could be justified by reference to some other districting
principle. 163
Interestingly, the court never cited the Shaw opinion for support
of this standard. Rather, it cites to Shaw for the general principle
that race-based districting is as injurious as other classifications
based on race," but never for the principle that the "substantial or
motivating" factor test should trigger strict scrutiny in this con-
text.' 65 In fact, the court concedes that it has not drawn this con-
clusion directly from Shaw, characterizing its conclusion as "the
necessary implication" of its Shaw analysis. 66
Hays v. Louisiana stated a much broader trigger standard, de-
claring that all racially gerrymandered districting plans would trig-
ger strict scrutiny.167 Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Shaw
that an unconstitutional plan would be one that could be "under-
stood only as an effort to segregate voters... ,"68 the Hays court
emphasized that the State would not defeat a racial gerrymander-
ing claim merely by showing that factors other than race influenced
the design of the districting plan. Rather, the court interpreted the
Shaw holding to require that the State-show that "the contours and
content of a redistricting plan can be wholly explained to be the
product of... factors other than race."' 69 That is, in order to rebut
a gerrymandering claim, a State must show that race played no fac-
tor in the design of a redistricting plan. Thus, the Hays court
162. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 431.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 431 (citing Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832, and explaining the dangers of race-
based districting).
165. For support of its interpretation that strict scrutiny is triggered by application
of the "race-a-motivating-factor" test, the Hunt court cites, not Shaw, but two district
court decisions: Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993), which was
subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court, and Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655,
671-72 (E.D. Ark. 1994)(Eisele, J., concurring), which did not even concern a Shaw
claim.
166. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 431.
167. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (1994). The court defined a racially
gerrymandered district as one intentionally drawn along racial lines or that "otherwise
intentionally segregates citizens into voting districts based on their race." Id.
168. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
169. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1202 (emphasis added).
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clearly pronounces a view even stricter than the Arlington Heights
standard.
The Johnson v. Miller170 court agreed that Arlington Heights es-
tablished the standard as to whether the court should apply strict
scrutiny, but interpreted it differently than the Hunt court 1 7' Un-
like the Hunt majority, the Johnson court interpreted the "substan-
tial or motivating" standard to require plaintiffs to prove that race
was the only plausible explanation for the district lines.172
The Johnson court relied on Shaw's discussion of voting rights
precedent in support of its conclusion. 73 The cases cited by Shaw
established that a satisfactory showing of intent required not
merely that race was a substantial motivation behind a particular
district, but that no other equally plausible motivation existed. 74
Nevertheless, it conceded that the Shaw intent standard is more
onerous than that used in the cited cases, because those cases were
decided prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 75 which le-
gitimized the use of race in districting. Therefore, the court charac-
terized the triggering test as requiring a demonstration "that racial
concerns are the only ones plausibly to be inferred from the dis-
trict's lines.' 1 76 The Johnson court added a caveat that it was not
holding that race need be the "sole motivation" in order to trigger
strict scrutiny.177
The Johnson court feared that the standard applied in Hunt
would cause voting rights litigation to "sweep the country at ten-
170. Johnson v. Miller, No. CIV.A.194-008, 1994 WL 506780 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 12,
1994), stay granted, 115 S. Ct. 36 (1994).
171. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *14.
172. Id. at *15 ("Where it cannot be shown that race was the "substantial" or "mo-
tivating" factor behind a voting district by demonstrating that racial concerns are the
only ones plausibly to be inferred from the district's lines, there is no valid Equal
Protection claim.").
173. Id. at *15 (citing Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-27).
174. Id. at *15. The court's discussion focused on Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52, 56-57 (1964), in which an Equal Protection challenge to a districting plan was
dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the district lines were influ-
enced primarily by race: "It may be true ... that there was evidence which could have
supported inferences that racial considerations might have moved the state legisla-
ture, but even so, we agree that there also was evidence to support his finding that the
contrary inference was 'equally or more persuasive.'" Wright, 376 U.S. at 56-57 (cita-
tions omitted).
175. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *15.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *16. This would provide a scenario on the opposite scale of the Hunt
interpretation. Plaintiffs would never be able to prove that race was the only motivat-
ing factor, and thus this burden would be as onerous on plaintiffs as the Hunt standard
would be on defendants. Id.
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year intervals.' 178 It predicted that if the court disallowed race as a
factor in districting, every state and local government subject to the
requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act would face liti-
gation with every new districting plan.179 The Johnson court con-
cluded that a district should trigger strict scrutiny only when the
use of race is "abused," and the district lines are unexplainable on
grounds other than race. 80
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny in the Redistricting Context
Application of the strict scrutiny test to a Shaw claim is challeng-
ing for lower courts because the Shaw majority provided little gui-
dance.'8 ' While the courts have easily resolved the issue of burden
of proof, holding that the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with
the plaintiffs, 8 2 the courts have differed as to the specific applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny analysis.
a. Compelling State Interest
At the outset of its "compelling interest" discussion, the Shaw v.
Hunt court stressed that the critical inquiry was whether the state
had a compelling interest in enacting any race-based redistricting
plan and therefore did not need to analyze the particular plan at
the "compelling interest" stage.'8 3 Instead, the court stated that it
would scrutinize the particular plan under the "narrowly tailored"
prong. In contrast, the Johnson court did focus on the compelling
interest of the State in creating the particular plan in dispute. Both
Hunt and Johnson examined the same two interests, however: com-
pliance with the Voting Rights Act and eradication of the effects of
past and present racial discrimination in North Carolina.8 4
178. Id. at *16.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *16.
181. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 434 (noting that "while Shaw offers some brief sugges-
tions about what this standard might require in the redistricting context... it does not
actually apply it to this particular districting plan").
182. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1199; Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 436; Johnson, 1994 WL
506780 at *22.
183. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 437.
184. In Johnson, the State had also argued that proportional representation was a
compelling state interest. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *22. The court dealt with this
claim only briefly because proportional representation is neither a constitutional nor
statutory requirement. It further noted that such a goal would establish quotas, ex-
pressly prohibited in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
The court concluded its denial of this claim with reference to the recent Supreme
Court decision in Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994). DeGrandy estab-
lished that while proportional representation could be presented as evidence of non-
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The Hays court did not perform a compelling interest analysis.
Unlike the Hunt court, the Hays court did not see the need to dis-
tinguish the compelling interest stage of analysis from the narrowly
tailored stage. The Hays defendants offered four governmental in-
terests in support of the districting plan, but because the court con-
cluded that the plan was not narrowly tailored to meet those
interests even if they were compelling, it chose not to analyze them
in detail.185
i. Compliance With the Voting Rights Act
Under the general principles established in the race-based reme-
186 teHndial action cases, the Hunt court held that a state has a compel-
ling interest in engaging in race-based districting "whenever it has
a 'strong basis in evidence' for concluding that such action is 'nec-
essary' to prevent its electoral districting scheme from violating the
Voting Rights Act."'" The court analogized the Voting Rights Act
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,'8 stating that if compliance
dilution under § 2, it is not required. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2651. The same point
was made in the Shaw opinion. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830.
185. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1206. The proffered governmental interests were as fol-
lows: conformity with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, conformity with § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, proportional representation of African-Americans in the Louisiana Con-
gressional Delegation, and remedying the effects of past racial discrimination in Con-
gress. Id.Although these claims were not analyzed in the main opinion, a concurring opinion
dismissed them as insufficient. See id. at 1216-18 (Walter, J., concurring). According
to this concurrence, because the constituents were not geographically compact,. the
Plan did not meet the first prong of the Gingles test. Id. at 1217 (Walter, J., concur-
ring). Additionally, because Louisiana had one minority district prior to this plan and
this plan was designed to create two minority districts, the State could not claim that
§ 5 applied, because there would have been no retrogression of minority voting
strength if only one minority district had been included in the new plan. Therefore,
§ 5 only mandated that the new plan maintain the one minority district that existed
before. Id. In addition, because § 2 expressly states that proportional representation
of any minority group is not required, the court would have quickly dismissed this
claim had it analyzed it. Id. Lastly, the concurrence turned to Croson as evidence
that the Supreme Court has severely limited the ability of legislatures, to remedy past
discrimination. In Croson, the Court held that before remedying past discrimination,
a state must "identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity."
Id. at 1215 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989)).
186. See supra note 150 (listing race-based remedial action cases).
187. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 437. The court examined the Supreme Court's treatment
of statutory compliance as a compelling interest in the race-based remedial action
cases. It found that the Supreme Court has recognized that a state's compelling inter-
est in remedying past discrimination extends to "remedying past or present violations
of federal statutes that are designed to'eradicate such discrimination ...... Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
188. 42 U.S.C. 2000e, e-17 (1964).
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with the latter act is a compelling interest,189 then compliance with
the voting law is even "more compelling," for Title VII is based
only on the commerce power, while the Voting Rights Act is "a
direct exercise of Congress' broad constitutional power to enforce
the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments."'"
The Hunt court found nothing in the Shaw opinion that would
contradict its interpretation. In fact, the Shaw Court explicitly ex-
pressed that states have a "very strong interest" in complying with
the Voting Rights Act, "at least to the extent it is constitutionally
valid as interpreted and as applied."'191 The Hunt court therefore
concluded that because the Supreme Court has upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Voting Rights Act in several contexts,'19 the Shaw
opinion supports the notion that compliance with the Act is a com-
pelling state interest.
The Hunt court also interpreted the terms "strong basis in evi-
dence" and "necessary" within the definition of "compelling state
interest." 93 It determined that a state would have a "strong basis
in evidence" for concluding that it must engage in race-based dis-
tricting, "when it has information sufficient to support a prima fa-
cie showing that its failure to do so would violate the Act."'194
According to the Hunt court, this situation would arise when either
the state has been presented with information sufficient to support
a prima facie Section 2 challenge to a single-member districting
scheme,195 or when a plan previously submitted by the state has
189. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75 (plurality); id. at 289-93 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
190. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 438.
191. Id. (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830).
192. The Court has specifically upheld § 5. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966)(determining that while § 5 was an "uncommon exercise of
congressional power," its passage was justified); City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 180-182 (1980)(declining to rule that the 1975 extension of the preclearance
requirement was not justified). The Court has also upheld § 2. See Chisom v. Roe-
mer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2362 (recounting that § 2, as originally passed, was coextensive
with the coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment)(1991); City of Rome, 446
U.S. at 177 (characterizing § 2 as an "appropriate method of promoting the purposes
of the Fifteenth Amendment").
193. Clearly, the state need not await a judicial or legislative finding that discrimi-
nation exists before taking state action; such a requirement would undermine a state's
incentive to voluntarily remedy discriminatory practices, and undermine the Congres-
sional goal of encouraging voluntary compliance with civil rights laws. Hunt, 861 F.
Supp. at 439 (citations omitted).
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 440. See also supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text
(discussing the Gingles standard for establishing a § 2 vote dilution claim).
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been denied preclearance under Section 5.196 Because. Section 2 is
not at issue in a Shaw claim, the court focused its discussion on
Section 5.197 In order to prove that it had a strong basis in evidence
for believing that the plan was necessary as designed to comply
with Section 5, the state must show that it was denied preclearance
by the Attorney General's Office, and must also "reasonably con-
clude, after conducting its own independent reassessment of the
rejected plan in light of the concerns identified by the Justice De-
partment, that the Justice Department's conclusion is legally and
factually supportable.' '198
The Johnson court also found that compliance with the Voting
Rights Act is a compelling state interest, but stressed that the nar-
row tailoring stage overshadowed the compelling interest determi-
nation in this context. 199 While lamenting over the lack of
guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Shaw, the Johnson
court concluded that Shaw must have intended to rule that compli-
ance is a compelling interest under some circumstances, but only
when the action taken does not go beyond what is required under
the Act.2 °°
Thus, the Johnson court found that there is a strong relationship
between whether a plan was motivated to further a compelling
state interest and whether it was narrowly tailored to meet that
interest.201 In situations involving jurisdictions covered by Section
5,202 the Johnson court would assume a compelling interest, be-
196. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 441. See also supra note 79-84, and accompanying text
(discussing the standard for § 5 preclearance).
197. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (distinguishing a Shaw claim
from a § 2 vote dilution claim).
198. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 443. Plaintiffs had suggested that the Equal Protection
Clause requires the State to mount an unsuccessful challenge of a denial of
preclearance, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, before
compliance with § 5 can be deemed a compelling interest. The court rejected this
argument for a number of reasons. First, it would indicate disrespect for the authority
of the Attorney General, who has been authorized by Congress to make preclearance
decisions. Second, it would conflict with the policy of encouraging voluntary compli-
ance with Federal civil rights laws among the states. Third, it would encourage need-
less litigation, and would provide states with an opportunity to avoid their duty to
remedy past discrimination by engaging in protracted litigation. Id.
199. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *25.
200. Id. at *24 ("A most useful hint, however, comes from Justice O'Connor's in-
junction that courts 'bear in mind the difference between what the law permits, and
what it requires.' [T~he point here is that the VRA cannot justify all actions taken in
its name.") (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830).
201. Id. at *24-26.
202. For an explanation of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, see supra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
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cause the State could not have designed the contested plan without
Justice Department approval.0 3 Whether that assumption is justi-
fied however, turns on the narrow tailoring analysis. The Shaw
Court was careful to hold that a state may have a compelling inter-
est in taking action to comply with the Act whenever it believes
that such action is "necessary. ' '101 The Johnson court interpreted
this to mean that if the plan as designed does more than is neces-
sary, then the state never had a compelling state interest; if the
evidence shows that the plan in question was necessary, then the
state did have a compelling interest.2"5 Thus, the Johnson court
approaches the compelling interest analysis in a completely differ-
ent manner than the Hunt court. While the Hunt court focused on
whether the state had a compelling interest to design any plan to
increase minority voting strength, the Johnson court clearly at-
tempted to find whether the state had a compelling interest to de-
sign the particular plan in question. -°
ii. Eradicating the Effects of Past Discrimination
In both Hunt and Johnson, the states argued that they had com-
pelling interests in engaging in race-based redistricting to eradicate
the effects of past discrimination, even if not compelled to do so by
the Voting Rights Act.20 7 The Hunt court held that indeed this was
a compelling interest, but the Johnson court disagreed.
The Hunt court concluded that the eradication of the effects of
past discrimination serves as a compelling state interest for much
of the same reason that it found that a state has a compelling inter-
est in complying with the Voting Rights Act.208 Relying heavily on
the "remedial measure" cases again, the court held that a state
could show the compelling interest as long as it could point to in-
stances of "specific discrimination" within its own political
processes and not merely "societal discrimination. ' '2° As a practi-
cal matter, however, a state would rarely rely on eradication as a
justification, because the same evidence of discrimination neces-
sary to prove this interest would also prove a need to comply with
203. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *26.
204. Id. at *24 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831).
205. Id. at *25.
206. Id. at *25.
207. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *23; Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 443
(E.D.N.C. 1994). In Johnson, this interest was not raised by the State, but by the
Department of Justice as Intervenor-defendants. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *22.
208. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 443.
209. Id. (citations omitted).
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the Voting Rights Act.210 Nevertheless, the court maintained that a
state could claim that eradication of past discrimination was an in-
dependent compelling interest if that state had a history of official
past discrimination, yet for some reason was not subject to the re-
quirements of the Voting Rights Act.2 n
The Johnson court concluded that a state has no compelling state
interest in eradicating the effects of prior discriminatory voting
practices independent of the Voting Rights Act.2 2 The court
found that there was no strong Supreme Court precedent support-
ing such a contention,213 and that the Voting Rights Act itself had
established a sufficient remedial program for that purpose.21 4
Thus, according to the court, any remedial interest the state may
have claimed was completely subsumed by the mandate of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.21 5 If a plan went beyond the requirements of the
Act it would no longer be narrowly tailored to achieve any other
compelling interest. Unlike the Hunt court, the Johnson majority
thought it unlikely that a situation would exist where remedial ac-
tion was necessary but the Act did not apply.21 6 The court main-
tained that the Act is an adequate protection against intrusions on
the right to vote; recognition of any compelling interest beyond
compliance with the Act would only loosen the "leash" that the
Act places on race-based remedial measures in districting.21 7
210. Id. See supra notes 186-98, and accompanying text (summarizing the Hunt
discussion of compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a compelling state interest).
211. Such a situation would arise where a state knew that it had a history of official
racial discrimination within its political system but that the relevant minority group
would not be able to bring a successful § 2 claim because its members were too geo-
graphically dispersed throughout the state to constitute a "geographically compact"
single-member district in accordance with Gingles. Id.
212. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *23.
213. Id. ("The Supreme Court [in Shaw] ... did take time to note that 'only three
Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimiz-
ing the consequences of racial block voting apart from the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act.' ") (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832) (citations omitted).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *24 n.29 ("[W]e are here presented with a textbook example of 'hard
cases' making 'bad law'. . . ; the improbability of the [Hunt] scenario indicates its
dubious value as scaffolding for constitutional arguments.") (quoting Northern Secur-
ities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 363 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
1 217. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *24. The court contended that the Voting Rights
Act acceptably limits the scope of remedial measures a state may make in order to
limit the potential harm that can be caused by such measures: "The VRA ensures that
states honor the right to vote; our recognition of no other compelling state justifica-
tion for race-based voting remedies ensures that states do not go too far." Id.
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b. Narrow Tailoring Analysis
Although the Shaw Court did not explicitly mandate how a state
could narrowly tailor a districting plan, all the district courts inter-
preting Shaw have agreed that a plan would not be narrowly tai-
lored if it affects the rights and interests of citizens more than
"reasonably necessary to advance the interest claimed by the
state. '218 Beyond that, the courts have disagreed on the impor-
tance to be given various districting factors such as compactness,
and to what extent a plan need comply with the Voting Rights Act
to be considered narrowly tailored. In general, the courts have
held that plans that create as many minority-majority plans as pos-
sible and that do not comply with traditional districting factors are
not narrowly tailored. Notably, only the North Carolina plan at
issue in Hunt has been upheld.
Of the five factors that the Supreme Court has traditionally used
to find whether a race-based remedial measure is narrowly tai-
lored, two are relevant in a Shaw claim. The first is whether the
state could have accomplished its purpose with a race-neutral or
less race-conscious method. The second factor that courts consider
is whether the plan at issue imposes an undue burden on the rights
of innocent third persons.219
218. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *26 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831). See also
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 409, 444 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp.
1188, 1206 (W.D. La. 1993).
219. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 445-46. The other three factors traditionally used in
remedial measure cases do not significantly affect the outcome of an Equal Protection
analysis of a state-designed voting district, although the Hunt court analyzed them at
length. The first of the remaining factors, whether the plan imposes a "strict racial
quota" or a "flexible goal" towards increasing minority representation, is inapposite,
because districting plans rarely, if ever, impose the sort of quota that is constitution-
ally impermissible. Id. at 446. Unlike racial set-aside provisions, a districting plan
that creates a certain number of districts in which members of a minority group con-
stitute a majority, does not guarantee a fixed number of representatives of that race,
because members of other races are still permitted to run and to be elected within
those districts. Id.
The court found that consideration of the second factor, the duration of the plan,
was unnecessary because districting plans are "inherently temporary." Id. at 447. A
state action is not narrowly tailored if it will last longer than necessary to redress the
discriminatory effects at issue. The court reasoned, however, that because states are
forced to redistrict after every census, they will reevaluate the need for majority-mi-
nority districts at that time and remove them if they are no longer necessary. Iid The
court's reasoning ignores that from a realistic standpoint, once a district is created it is
rarely drawn out of the plan. Most states have an official policy of protecting incum-
bents and therefore would probably attempt to maintain any existing districts in a
plan whether demographic changes mandated them or not.
The third factor considers whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
plan's goal for minority representation in a pool selected to benefit from the plan and
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i. Was a Race-Neutral Alternative Available?
While traditional inquiries into race-based state action focus on
whether a race-neutral or less racially based alternative was avail-
able, courts must alter that analysis in the voting rights arena be-
cause of the widely accepted concession that a state with a
compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act has no
race-neutral alternative.220 Therefore, the inquiry is modified to
consider two questions: (i) whether the plan creates more majority-
minority districts than is reasonably necessary to comply with the
Act,221 and (ii) whether the districts created by the plan contain
substantially larger concentrations of minority voters than are nec-
essary to enable minority voters, when voting as a group, to elect a
candidate of their choice.222
The Hays court held that the Louisiana plan was not narrowly
tailored based on either of the two questions above. In so finding,
the court focused on the number of majority-minority districts cre-
ated, the percentage of African-American voters in the districts at
issue and the shape of these districts.223 The court did not focus on
the State's attempted compliance with section 5, but implied that
the state had gone beyond what that section requires.22 It inter-
preted Beer v. United States2 5 as providing that if a state previously
had one majority-minority Congressional district, the addition of
any more such districts would violate the non-retrogression princi-
ple.226 The Hays court also deemed the percentage of African-
Americans of voting age within District 4, 63%, to exceed the per-
centage necessary to ensure that African-Americans would be able
the percentage of minorities in the general population. Id. at 447-48. The court
found that this factor is satisfied "so long as the percentage of majority-minority dis-
tricts created by the plan.., does not substantially exceed the percentage of minority
voters in the jurisdiction as a whole." Id. at 448. Because neither the Hunt plan, nor
any of the plans at issue before the courts at this time provide for even near-propor-
tional representation for minorities, this factor while important, is not very relevant to
the courts or to this Note's analysis at this time.
220. Id. at 445.
221. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *12-15; Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 446; Hays, 839 F.
Supp. at 1206-09. This question is a reverse of the Beer non-retrogression principle.
While a state may not design a plan that results in a retrogression of minority voting
strength and still comply with § 5, it also may not do more than § 5 requires.
222. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *18-20; Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 446; Hays, 839 F.
Supp. at 1206-08. This question is aimed at eliminating "packing."
223. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1207.
224. Id. at 1207.
225. 425 U.S. 130 (1975). See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (explaining
the Beer non-retrogression principle).
226. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1207.
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to elect representatives of their choice.227 District 2, the other ma-
jority-African-American district, had an African-American popula-
tion of only 54%, leading the court to conclude that a similar racial
composition in District 4 would have been sufficient to enable the
African-American voters in that district to elect a candidate of
their choice.228 Regarding the shape of District 4, the Hays Court
noted the testimony of several witnesses who stated that a second
minority district could have been created that more closely fol-
lowed traditional districting principles.229
The Johnson court found similar offenses within the Georgia
plan. It contended that the plan reflected a "maximization
agenda" that did not bode well for the State's claims that it was
narrowly tailored.230 Additionally, the court noted at the outset
that the design of the plan apparently violated explicit Congres-
sional regulations accompanying the Voting Rights Act.231 Based
on those observations alone, the court concluded that the State had
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1207-08. TWo main factors are relevant to determine what percentage of
African-American voters will create a "safe" district. Where white crossover voting is
greater, a district will be safe with a minority voting age population around 50% or
perhaps slightly lower. In districts where minority voter registration is low, a higher
percentage of minorities within the voting age will be required unless high crossover
voting will counteract the lower African-American turnout. Because District 4 had a
relatively high minority population percentage, the court found no need to measure
the crossover voting within the district and instead examined whether African-Ameri-
can registration was significantly lower and found that it was not. Id. at 1208.
229. One such plan had been created randomly by a computer districting program.
While chastising the state for not creating the most compact majority African-Ameri-
can district possible, the court conveniently chose not to consider what factor incum-
bency protection played in these districting decisions. Previously the court had stated
that incumbency motives were irrelevant to the determination of racial gerrymander-
ing, but evidently they are not. Id. at 1209.
230. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *27.
231. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780 at *27. The court specified that the plan appeared
to conflict with the regulations promulgated by Congress, which mandated that the
Justice Department consider the following:
(e) The extent to which available alternative plans satisfying the jurisdic-
tion's legitimate governmental interests were considered;
(f) The extent to which the plan departs from objective redistricting criteria
set by the submitting jurisdiction, ignores other relevant factors such as com-
pactness and contiguity, or displays a configuration that inexplicably disre-
gards available natural or artificial boundaries.
28 C.F.R. § 51.59.
The court commented in conclusion, that it interpreted the term "inexplicably" in
the quoted material above as "envisioninga district with lines unexplainable as any-
thing other than an effort to exclude African-American voters" yet that in this case
the offense concerned "a district unexplainable as anything other than an effort to
exclude white voters." Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *27.
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not narrowly tailored the plan. The court nevertheless analyzed
the plan with reference to the relevant sections of the Act. 232 .
Like the Hays court, the Johnson court found it "abundantly
clear" that the state had exceeded the requirements of the non-
retrogression principle of Section 5.233 It objected to the creation
of three majority-minority districts for two reasons. First, the pre-
vious Congressional districting scheme had included one majority-
minority district. Therefore, by creating three such districts, the
State exceeded the requirements of Section 5.34 Second, the crea-
tion of three majority-minority districts appeared to be motivated
by an attempt to achieve proportional representation,235 which the
court reiterated was not a constitutional or statutory require-
ment.3 6 Unlike the Hunt court, the court in Johnson held no illu-
sions that such plans are "inherently temporary in nature,' 237 on
account of the non-retrogression principle of Section 5.238
The Johnson court also held that the plan exceeded the require-
ments of Section 2 compliance. 3 9 To reach this conclusion, the
232. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *27.
233. Id. at *28. See also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (explaining the
Beer non-retrogression principle).
234. Id. at *28 ("Federal regulations state that '[i]n determining whether a submit-
ted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will normally compare the submit-
ted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at the time of the submission.'
Apparently neither DOJ nor the General Assembly used this simple guide to section
5 compliance.") (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)).
The court implies that a new plan with two majority-minority districts would not
have gone beyond the requirements of the Act. Id. (Noting that in the previous plan
one district, or 10% of the total, was a majority-African-American district and there-
fore, in the new plan, two majority-African-American districts, constituting 18.8% of
the total would have represented "quite an improvement."). The Johnson opinion
gives no indication that the court abides by the standard propounded in Hays, that
any new plan including more than one majority-African-American district would have
exceeded the boundaries of § 5.
235. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *28 (explaining that three majority-African-
American districts would constitute 27.27% of the total number of districts and that
African-Americans constituted 29.96% of the total Georgia population).
236. Id. See supra note 184 (discussing the Johnson court's rejection of propor-
tional representation as a compelling state interest).
237. See supra note 219 (summarizing the Hunt court's assertion that because of
census changes, district plans are temporary).
238. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *29. The court stressed that the mandates of the
Voting Rights Act alter the "temporary" nature of districting plans. It predicted that
because the Act prohibits any voting changes that have a dilutive or retrogressive
effect upon minority voting strength, the plan ultimately approved out of this litiga-
tion "will become the absolute baseline for subsequent changes." Any plan designed
after the census taken in 2000 will have to include at least as many majority African-
American districts as the plan approved now.
239. Id. at *37.
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court examined the factual record to detect whether the creation of
the eleventh district was necessary, according to the Gingles test.21°
It found that the district did not satisfy the first Gingles condition
because the minority population in south-central Georgia was
neither large enough nor sufficiently compact to warrant the crea-
tion of that district.241 In accordance with the Shaw rhetoric, the
Johnson court also objected to the grouping of persons whom the
record indicated had little in common besides their skin color.24 2
On account of this alleged lack of commonality, the court impliedly
held that the state had not satisfied the second Gingles factor,
namely, political cohesiveness within the group.
The record also lacked evidence of bloc voting within the white
majority, thus falling short in terms of the third Gingles factor,
which states that white voters, voting as a bloc, consistently prevent
minority voters from electing the candidate of their choice. The
court found a significant degree of "crossover" voting in Georgia
and in District 11, concluding that on average, 22% to 38% of
white voters voted for African-American candidates, while 20% to
23% of African-American voters voted for white candidates.24 a
The Johnson court also noted the success of African-American and
African-American-preferred candidates in local and statewide
elections as evidence of a lack of voter polarization.244
Lastly, the Johnson court studied the racial composition of voters
within the district. The court found that the district packed too
great a percentage of African-American voters and held that the
evidence presented did not support the need for such a large con-
centration of voters.245 In fact, the evidence showed that the com-
240. Id. at *31. See also supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing the
Gingles standard for establishing vote dilution).
241. The state had attempted to show that the district was sufficiently compact by
the use of the "meanderingness test." The test, created by the State's expert witness,
Dr. Lisa Handley, measures the irregularity of a district's shape by determining how
much of the district can be reached by straight lines emanating from that one point in
the district yielding "the highest percentage of direct, straight line accessibility." Id.
at *32 (quoting Rpt. of Dr. Handley, at 8-9). The court criticized the test as useless as
an accurate measure of District Eleven because it ignores any part of a district that
cannot be reached by a straight line. District Eleven contains several "narrow,
densely populated appendages" that are not included in the measurement. Id.
242. Id. (characterizing the State's assertion that the persons within the district con-
stituted a community of interest as "shallow and offensive thinking").
243. Id. at *34.
244. Id.
245. The state had argued that in order for a majority-African-American district to
ensure that African-American voters could elect a representative of their choice, Af-
rican-American voters had to account for at least 65% of its total population. Id. at
*35.
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position of the district at issue gave African-American candidates a
73% chance of winning an election.246 It also characterized this
result as far greater than "equal" opportunity, and therefore in ex-
cess of the requirements of Section 2.247
The North Carolina district court took a more limited approach
in holding that the Hunt plan was narrowly tailored. Although it
agreed with the Hays court that a plan would not survive strict
scrutiny if it failed to comply with the Constitutionally mandated
principles of districting, the Hunt court could not hold the same for
a plan that simply deviated from non-constitutional districting prin-
ciples.248 Therefore, the court refused to read Shaw as the Hays
court did, and even predicted that the Supreme Court would not
adopt the Hays view when it eventually defines "narrow tailoring"
in the redistricting context. 249 Among the reasons cited by the
Hunt court for this proposition were that those criteria have little
inherent value in the districting process, are not measurable by a
"simple and judicially manageable" standard, and would result in
undue interference by the federal judiciary in political matters. 250
ii. Does the Plan Burden Innocent Third Parties?
The courts have differed as to whether a race-based redistricting
plan imposes an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties.
The courts have also differed as to the significance of this factor.25 1
In fact, the Johnson court did not even consider this as a separate
The 65% rule has been the standard rule of thumb in voting rights litigation. This
figure was chosen based on an assumption that approximately 5% of African-Ameri-
cans will not be of voting age, another 5% will not be registered, and a certain per-
centage will not vote under any circumstances. It also assumes a negligible amount of
white crossover voting, and so insures that African-American voters will retain a vot-
ing strength slightly greater than 50% of the voting age population. Id.; see also Hays
v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1207 (W.D. La. 1993)(describing the 63% black vot-
ing population of Louisiana's Congressional District 4).
246. The court criticized the State's expert for basing her findings on the registered
African-American population rather than the voting age African-American popula-
tion. It surmised that an estimate based only on registered voters, "amounts to an
incentive for and institutionalization of black voter apathy," which the court would
not condone. Johnson, 1994 WL 506780, at *36. Voting age population would be the
proper measure because it does not attempt to compensate for low registration or
turnout. Id.
247. The court also pointed out that had this estimate been based on voter age
population the probability would have been even higher. Id. at *37.
248. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 449 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
249. Id. at 451. See also Pildes and Niemi, supra note 36, at 584-85 (1993).
250. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 451-53. See also supra notes 34-42, and accompanying
text (critiquing compactness as a districting principle).
251. See Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 455-56; Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1207
(W.D. La. 1993).
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factor. The conflict among the courts derives from their differing
views as to the importance of compactness to the constitutional
analysis.
In Louisiana, the Hays court found that a plan would impose an
undue burden on third parties if it deviated from traditional no-
tions of geographical compactness, contiguity and respect for the
integrity of political subdivisions to a greater degree than necessary
to accomplish its compelling purpose.252 Thus, a court would inval-
idate a plan whenever a state could have drawn a different plan in a
way that did "substantially less violence" to traditional districting
principles, both those mandated by the constitution, such as "one
person, one vote," and those that are not.253 Because failure to
abide by those principles "adversely affected countless third-party
interests," the Hays court held that the plan at issue could not sur-
vive strict scrutiny and was therefore unconstitutional. 254
In North Carolina, the Hunt court also considered whether a
plan might unduly burden third parties because of the stigmatic
injury associated with racial classifications.255 While the court had
found that such an injury was sufficient for standing purposes, it
did not think that on that basis the plan could be considered as
imposing an undue burden.256 On the contrary, the court con-
cluded that Congress had adequately weighed the burdens imposed
by the Voting Rights Act when deliberating over its passage, and
found that they were not unacceptable given the compelling need
for the remedy provided by the Act.257 For that reason, the Hunt
court deferred to Congress' judgment.
3. The Impact of the District Court Decisions
The decisions in Hays, Johnson and even Hunt create an uncer-
tainty that should alarm districting advocates. Fortunately, the
Hays decision, which was the broadest of the three decisions, has
been vacated by the Supreme Court, indicating that even the Court
felt that Hays had read the Shaw decision too broadly.258 Hays,
252. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1208-09.
253. Id. at 1208.
254. Id. at 1209.
255. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 454.
256. Id. at 455.
257. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 456 ("We believe that Congress ... [balanced] ... the
need for race-based districting as a remedy for past and present discrimination in the
states' electoral procsses and the' burden that such measures impose upon innocent
third parties when it enacted and twice extended the ... Voting Rights Act.") (cita-
tions omitted).
258. Hays v. Louisiana, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994)(vacating lower court ruling).
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however, will still have a strong impact on this controversy; the
Supreme Court has recently announced that it would hear the ap-
peal of the Hays case to resolve the issue.259 The Supreme Court
has also issued a stay of the Johnson ruling pending review, render-
ing the Georgia districting plan temporarily still valid.2 ° Appeals
to the Hunt and Johnson decisions have also been filed with the
Court, but it has not yet ruled on whether it will hear those cases or
add them to its consideration of the Hays case.26'
Yet, the Johnson decision remains a threat to race-conscious dis-
tricting because it invalidated a district that is rather unremarkable
in its appearance. 262 This result highlights an additional problem
with Shaw that the lower court interpretations have uncovered-
that "bizarreness" exists only in the eye of the beholder. Although
the Shaw decision relied heavily on district shape as an indication
that a district violates the Equal Protection Clause, the district
court decisions appear to rely little on shape, and more on the re-
spective courts' preconceived notions about the legitimacy of race-
conscious districting. The conflict between the Hunt decision,
which upheld an extremely irregular district, and the Johnson deci-
sion, which invalidated an unsuspicious looking district, creates an
appearance of arbitrariness in the courts' decisionmaking that can
not continue:263
Another flaw in the lower court decisions is that, like the Shaw
decision, they neglect to acknowledge that the very "stereotypes"
they warn against are the very factors a, group must prove to estab-
lish a vote dilution claim under Gingles This creates a strange
double standard. If a state wishes to prove vote dilution to justify a
reapportionment scheme, it must acknowledge racial bloc voting.
On the other hand, if a state wants to remedy vote dilution, it may
259. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993)(3-judge panel), vacated,
114 S. Ct. 2731 (June 27, 1994)(remanded for reconsideration in light of new legisla-
tion), on remand, No. 92-1522, 1994 WL 477159 (W.D. La. July 29, 1994)(holding new
districting plan unconstitutional), cert. granted, United States v. Hays, 63 U.S.L.W.
3295 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1994).
260. Johnson v. Miller, 115 S. Ct. 36 (1994)(granting stay of district court ruling,
pending review).
261. Linda Greenhouse, Court Accepts a Crucial Redistricting Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 12, 1994, at 8; see also Joan Biskupic, High Court to Rule on Race-Based Con-
gressional Districts, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1994, at A3.
262. See Marcia Coyle, Politics, Law Clash in Racial Redistricting, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
31, 1994, at Al, A24 (characterizing the Georgia district as "hardly as bizarre as the
shape of Maryland").
263. Maps of the Georgia and North Carolina districts have been attached as Ap-
pendix A.
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not redistrict in a way that takes racial bloc voting into
consideration.
The inconsistencies among the decisions have only exacerbated
the districting controversy. While a clarification of Shaw is cer-
tainly necessary, perhaps there is an even more pressing need to
develop a new approach to districting that focuses less on race and
more on interests.
V. Solution: Reconciling Empowerment with Equal Protection
The real solution to the race-conscious districting controversy
may be to analogize the creation of such districts to politics instead
of to segregation. While the Supreme Court's reservations about
the excessive reliance upon race in districting may be grounded in
the best intentions, it may result in "devastating racial conse-
quences."264 A more interest-oriented approach would treat ma-
jority-minority districts not as racial gerrymanders but as political
gerrymanders, recognizing the reality that these districts are
designed to link persons of similar interests who happen to be of
the same race, not vice versa.
It is time to recognize that although all majority-minority dis-
tricting involves race, it is actually a form of political, and not racial
gerrymandering. The modem age of redistricting has been greatly
influenced by the Voting Rights Act. For the most part, the Act
has empowered and protected African-American voters, making it
much more difficult to completely shut them out of the political
system.
The use of race in districting today is largely different than it was
thirty years ago for two reasons. The most obvious is of course the
presence of the Voting Rights Act, which prevents district design-
ers from fencing African-American voters out of the political pro-
cess and actually mandates the creation of majority-minority
districts in certain districts. In addition, African-American voters
have already been empowered to the extent that they can influence
district lines and have often worked with Republican and Demo-
cratic politicians in manipulating district design.265 Accordingly,
African-American voters are able to form coalitions with each
other to argue for the issues that concern them and to try to sway
white voters and representatives on those issues. In that sense, a
districting plan in which some districts have been specifically
264. See Higginbotham, Jr. et al., supra note 2, at 1604.
265. See supra note 44 (chronicling relation between Republican incumbents and
voting rights advocates in designing Chicago districts).
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designed for white voters and. some for black voters, is less like
South Africa under apartheid, and more like Congress, where-
Democrats and Republicans must learn to work together. While
Congress is arguably ineffective, it is not unconstitutional.
On the same day that Thornburg v. Gingles2" was decided, the
Supreme Court decided Davis v. Bandemer,267 holding that the in-
tentional drawing of district boundaries for partisan ends does not,
in and of itself, violate the Equal Protection Clause.26 That deci-
sion held that political gerrymandering cases are justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause, but that "a threshold showing of dis-
criminatory vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an
equal protection violation. '269 The Court added that even where a
party has drawn lines with "the specific intention of disadvantaging
one political party's election prospects," there has been no uncon-
stitutional discrimination unless the redistricting in fact disadvan-
tages that party at the polls. 270 Moreover, the Court held, as it did
in early multi-member district challenges,27' that mere loss in an
individual election does not suffice to create a "strong indicia of
lack of political power and the denial of fair representation. "272
Application of the Davis standard to Shaw claims would provide
a fair, objective resolution to this controversy. No group of white
voters can prove that their votes have been diluted simply because
they have been placed in a majority-minority district where their
chosen candidate is unlikely to win. They cannot show that they
have been denied fair representation any more than the democratic
plaintiffs in Davis could make that showing. Plaintiffs making a
Shaw claim might attempt to distinguish themselves from Davis by
claiming that they have been segregated on a racial basis.
Although they have been segregated for reasons rooted in race, the
causes of their segregation actually extend much more broadly
than race. Because of their differing histories, African-American
voters and white voters have different political views, have sepa-
rate needs and seek different benefits from their elected represent-
atives. In that sense, they are no different than members of
266. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
267. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
268. Id. at 139.
269. Id. at 143.
270. Id. at 139.
271. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (chronicling early vote dilution
challenges).
272. Davis, 478 U.S. at 139.
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competing political parties who want differing commitments from
elected representatives.
Treating Shaw claims as political gerrymanders and applying the
Davis standard to these claims will resolve the majority-minority
controversy more fairly than the Shaw standard. First, requiring
that plaintiffs show that they have been shut out of the political
process provides a more manageable standard that does not de-
pend on a factor as subjective as shape in order to determine a
districting plan's validity. Second, applying the political gerryman-
der standard would lessen the stigma on newly created majority-
minority districts by focusing on the diversity of interests among
white and minority voters instead of the diversity of colors.
In adopting terms such as "segregation" and "political
apartheid," while still professing 'a desire that justice be "color
blind," the Court underestimates its own influence. The Court in-
sists steadfastly that the districts at issue in Shaw, which result from
lobbying, negotiation and compromise on the part of all relevant
interest groups, are inherently illegitimate because one or more of
those groups is of a different racial background. At the same time,
it upholds the legitimacy of majority-white political gerrymanders
that are created through the same process. If the Court were to
cease treating interest-oriented white districts differently from sim-
ilar minority districts, the public would be less likely to doubt the
legitimacy of the latter districts. Because the public's attitude to-
ward representation would be more interest-oriented instead of
race-oriented, members of different races might stop focusing on
race so heavily, and might instead realize that they have more in
common than they previously realized.
A third reason that it would be more fair and effective to apply
the Davis standard, is that the Davis standard will more effectively
further the goal of the Voting Rights Act of empowering minority
voters. It will acknowledge that minority representation should be
increased not because minorities deserve to be treated differently,
but because their political interests often are different, for valid
and substantial reasons. Once the general public recognizes that
many differences among the races are caused by legitimately di-
verse interests, people of like interests but different races will be
more likely to form coalitions. In the long run, this will broaden
the appeal of minority candidates and increase their chances of
election. Additionally, the Davis standard will lessen voting rights
litigation, as plaintiffs will understand exactly what proof is neces-
sary to sustain a claim, and fewer frivolous claims will be brought.
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Ironically, the author of the Shaw opinion, Justice O'Connor,
concurred in the Davis judgment, but argued that "the legislative
business of apportionment is fundamentally a political affair, and
challenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been car-
ried out ... present a political question in the truest sense of the
word. ' 273 Yet in Shaw she assumed that majority-minority district
design is prompted by racial motives and not political motives, as if
the two have nothing in common. It may be .time to rethink that
view.
VL Conclusion
Since the 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights Act, bizarre
districting has quietly flourished. This districting has not sup-
pressed any racial group, however, but has promoted and en-
couraged new interest groups that share a commonality of
interests, not unlike that shared within political parties. Shaw and
its progeny will no doubt inspire challenges by, disgruntled voters
claiming that their districts .are forms of "political apartheid" and
that they too have been denied the right to participate in a "color
blind electoral process. "274 In setting the standard upon which
those claims will be judged, the Supreme Court should rethink its
approach so that it is less racially-focused and more interest-
focused.:
If the Court adopts the Davis v. Bandemer standard, it will cre-
ate a fairer resolution to this controversy and will encourage the
public to acknowledge the legitimate commonality of interests
prevalent among minority groups. Minority representation will in-
crease while at the same time the race of those representatives will
lessen in significance as they become noted for their interests and
their achievements, rather than their color. This resolution will dif-
'fuse the current controversy and allow representatives elected out
of those districts to spend less time worrying about litigation and
more time worrying about representing their constituents.
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273. Davis, 478 U.S. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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